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PRACTICAL BENEFITS OF LITERATURE IN LAW, AND THEIR
LIMITS
James L. Robertson*
My literature is confined to the effort to make it in the
form of judicial decisions, and I occasionally manage to
slip a phrase past the negative vigilance of my brethren.
- 0. W. Holmes to Lewis Einstein (1914)
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
The job description for a good judge should include "the wisdom of
Solomon, the patience of Job and the humanity of Shakespeare."2 Many do not
always understand the humanity component. At best we sense it least, but this is
like not sensing how our lives would be lacking if all music had ended with
Mozart, if we never had Beethoven's odd number symphonies, Wagner or the
great Russians among whom only Tchaikovsky is appreciated appropriately. Or
if baseball had remained in the Dead Ball Era, so that we celebrated only the
glories of Cy Young and Ty Cobb and Honus Wagner. Or if we had nothing
beyond Newtonian physics with which to understand and explore the natural
world, or could see only what Galileo could see of the wonders of the Universe.
Or if to light our way through the social, political and economic phases of life,
all we had were what Plato and Aristotle and Thucydides taught, and the
practices of the Romans who followed. If I am right in these, that we do not
appreciate-much less engage appropriately-the humanity component of good
legal practice, what follows may help.
A few years back, Justice Evelyn Keyes of Texas argued3 that one can
never become "a great judge without a thorough grounding in what the
humanities, including literature, as well as the law itself, really do have to teach
us."4 She closed with a more elaborate version of the same provocative point,
viz., with such a grounding "he has at least the possibility of becoming a great
judge, which, without these attributes, he can never be." 5 The more modest "a
very good judge" might taste better. That aside, I am taken with the positive
* B. A., University of Mississippi, 1962; J. D., Harvard University, 1965; Justice, Supreme Court of
Mississippi, 1983-1992. For reviewing parts of prior drafts and their comments and encouragement, thanks to
David J. Greenberg, Michael Greenwald, E. Grady Jolly, Evelyn Keyes, Stephanie Middleton, Linda A.
Thompson, and Margaret V. Turano. For research assistance, thanks to Jason Andrew Kamp, Candice Rucker,
and J. Lott Warren; also, thanks to James Russell Dumas, Ethan Samsel, andthe editorial board of the MC Law
Review for their editing and proofing of the Article. Without hesitation or qualification, all screw ups are my
responsibility.
1. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Lewis Einstein (Apr. 17, 1914) in THE HOLMES-
EINSTEIN LETTERS: CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND LEWIS EINSTEIN, 1903-1935, 89 (James
Bishop Peabody ed. 1964).
2. Cheek v. Ricker, 431 So.2d 1139, 1143 (Miss. 1983) (Robertson, J., in a prior life).
3. Evelyn Keyes, The Literary Judge: The Judge as Novelist and Critic, 44 HOUSTON L. REV. 679
(2007). Justice Keyes sits on the Texas Court of Appeals, First District.
4. Id. at 680.
5. Id. at 701.
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points made.
The law most assuredly is a dimension of the humanities. It has arisen from
human experience and governs human behavior. Law creates opportunities. Its
end is a society in a continuous process of becoming and in which we should
want to live. Keyes also notes the other side of the coin, "[O]nly a morally
literate and humanistically informed people can maintain a free society against
the dehumanizing forces of totalitarian ideology and destructiveness that
constantly assail it, for only then will they know what is at stake."6 "Ay, there's
the rub." 7
Today I point to instances where judges (including yours truly, in a prior
life) have turned to the humanities, particularly literature, to enrich the message
of their adjudications. I focus on four cases, and the strategies by which each
was adjudged. Almost ninety years ago, a night watchman drowned in the
Savannah River trying to save his dog, and the question was how the court
should see his widow's claim for workers' compensation death benefits.8 The
Supreme Court of Georgia did something special.
The other three are from Mississippi. One was about hunters headlighting
and slaughtering deer at night and out of season, and how e should understand
and punish their misdemeanant behavior.9 Then there was the litigational
contretemps of a church-led effort to ban beer in a college town, its gratuitous
consequences for unsuspecting long time area residents, and what insights
should be brought to bear beyond the technical rules of public referenda.10
Finally, there is a case about a cultural war over access to a fine fishing hole
where not everyone with a license could go and fish.11
I will present the Georgia case first and in full. Then, I will walk through
more familiar and lesser categories of legal resort to the humanities-and
illustrations of each-well used and sometimes not so well used. At all levels
good judges practice humanity by being good observers and good listeners, by
being on guard lest they take themselves too seriously.
Expect no panaceas. Some may see my case no stronger than the exchange
between the Baptist and the Methodist familiar in my part of the world, viz., the
Baptist: "How can you possibly believe in infant baptism?" The Methodist:
6. Id. at 699. Though I accept the general point, I'd want to know a little more about what lies within
and without "totalitarian ideology and destructiveness." Id. I might add the dehumanizing forces of
ordinariness and malaise and poverty, of religious intolerance within and without Christianity or Judaism, and
of unawareness of wonders, missed times to dream.
7. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1, In. 65 in THE PLAYS AND SONNETS OF WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE (William G. Clarke and William A. Wright eds., 1952) (subsequent citations to Shakespeare are
from this edition).
8. Montgomery v. Maryland Casualty Co., 151 S.E. 363 (Ga. 1930). See infra notes 12-36 and
accompanying text.
9. Pharr v. State, 465 So. 2d 294 (Miss.1984). See infra notes 250-59 and accompanying text.
10. City of Clinton v. Smith, 493 So.2d 331 (Miss. 1986). See infra notes 260-74 and accompanying
text.
11. Dycus v. Sillers, 557 So. 2d 486 (Miss. 1990). See infra notes 275-80 and accompanying text. I
authored the controlling opinions in Pharr, City of Clinton, and Dycus. I remain of the view that a larger than
ordinary, literature-based stratagem was useful in all three cases. The extent to which the stratagem may have
been well executed or over time has succeeded is for others to judge, within the court of public opinion, and on
a case by case basis.
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"Believe in it?!? Hell, I've seen it done!" My faith is that a fair number of those
who peruse these pages may emerge with a better feeling about the law and
adjudication and how they may be practiced, though it may be necessary to
withdraw for a while from the get-and-spend world and the entertainment of
your hand-held electronic device of choice. The pause that refreshes is the
reflective pause.
II. A JUDICIAL PAEAN TO "MAN'S BEST FRIEND"
Montgomery v. Maryland Casualty Co., 12 is a workers' compensation case.
A night watchman for a boat repair service along the Savannah River drowned in
the river on his employers' premises, and his widow claimed workers'
compensation death benefits. It seems the watchman regularly brought his dog
to work. On the fateful night, the dog jumped or fell into the river. The
watchman followed into the water to save the dog, but, as fate would have it,
could not save himself. Without surprise, this was not a death covered under the
compensation act. Many a court would have matter-of-factly brushed it off and
affirmed the compensation commission's denial of benefits. Many a state
supreme court would have denied certiorari after the court of appeals had
affirmed.
Justice Stirling Price Gilbert of the Supreme Court of Georgia did
something wonderful, a paean to the dog and his contributions to the quality of
our lives, as man's best friend and otherwise. In his autobiography, Gilbert tells
of his childhood and of "my most loyal friend and companion, . . . in courage
and intelligence and indeed loyalty,... an aristocrat among animals."1 3 He had
named his "bench-legged, rather long-bodied mongrel" appropriately: "Lion!" 14
How Montgomery came to be should be told in Gilbert's words.
After I had become a Justice of the Supreme Court of Georgia, a
case involving a dog fell to me for writing the decision.
Immediately the memory of my dog Lion filled my mind. In
fact, my heart was touched, for no man ever loses his regard for
a loyal playmate, whether human or beast. There came over me
a desire to seize the opportunity to place on the enduring pages
of the decisions of our Supreme Court a tribute to the dog,
which would also be in some sense a memorial to Lion.15
And so Justice Gilbert turned to history and literature, philosophy and
poetry. To be sure, the court syllabus states, "It may be added that the dog was
probably in no danger of drowning and that the humane act of the watchman in
endeavoring to rescue him constituted in itself the only element of danger."'6
12. 151 S.E. 363 (Ga. 1930), aff'g Montgomery v. Maryland Casualty Co., 146 S.E. 504 (Ga. App.
1929).
13. Stirling Price Gilbert, A Georgia Lawyer: His Observations and Service, 15 (1946).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 15-16.
16. Montgomery, 151 S.E. at 363.
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Gilbert affirmed the humanity of the court17 as it affirmed the denial of death
benefits. He began by reminding us that:
[f]rom the dawn of primal history the dog has loomed large in
the art and literature of the world, including judicial literature.
So it doubtless will be until the "crack of doom." In metal and
in stone his noble image has been perpetuated, but the dog's
chief monument is in the heart of his friend, "man." As a house
pet, a watchdog, a herder of sheep and cattle, in the field of
sport, and as the motive power of transportation, especially in
the ice fields of the far north, as well as in the Antartics [sic], the
dog has ever been a faithful companion and helper of man. In
the trackless forests of the new world he was on the firing line of
civilization in the task of subduing all enemies, whether savage
man or wild beast.18
Gilbert then turned to the world of classical mythology, where:
[w]e find in astrology the dog star is "the brightest star in the
heavens; the Aplha [sic] of the constellation Canis Major," and
in Greek mythology Cerberus is the watchdog at the entrance to
the infernal regions. Diana, the goddess, had her deer hounds,
and literature is enriched by the story of Odysseus's (Ulysses')
dog Argos. After twenty years of war and wandering this king
of Ithaca returned, unrecognized in his beggar rags even by
Penelope, but as he entered the courtyard: "Lo! A hound raised
up his head and pricked his ears. In times past the men used to
lead the hound against wild goats and deer and hares, but as then
despised he lay in the deep dung of mules and kine. There lay
the dog Argos, full of fleas. Yet even now, when he was aware
of Odysseus standing by, he wagged his tail and dropped both
his ears, but nearer to his Lord he had not strength to draw.
Odysseus looked aside and brushed away a tear. Therewith he
passed into the fair-lying house and went straight to the hall, to
the company of the proud wooers. But upon Argos came black
death, even in the hour that he beheld his master again, in the
twentieth year."' 9
Gilbert adds that:
[m]asters of the brush have pictured the dog on canvas
everlasting, among them Landseer, Blake, Tracy, and Andrea
17. Gilbert added one regret, "that the greatest dog-lover among my associates on the Bench, Justice
[Samuel C.] Atkinson, was disqualified from participating in the decision because he was related to one
counsel in the case." Gilbert, supra note 13 at 16.
18. Montgomery, 151 S.E. at 364.
19. Id.
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del Sarto. The last-named painted "Tobias accompanied by the
angel Raphael."20
For reasons not clear Gilbert only scratches the surface there. No doubt his
art teacher has posthumously taken a ruler to once young Price Gilbert's
knuckles for not at least continuing art appreciation in his adult year so that, by
the time he became a Justice, he was moved by the great rendering of the
emotions in a dog's face in Thomas Hovenden's "Breaking Home Ties."2 1 The
young man's sister consoles his heartbroken dog as his master is about to leave
rural America for a job and new life in the city. Hovendon's poignant
masterpiece conjures images of a young Price Gilbert, a "Georgia Country Boy,"
leaving his home in rural Stewart County in 1879 for Nashville and Vanderbilt
University, and Lion's lament at his master's matriculation. Renoir's "Portrait
of Alfred B6rard with His Dog,"2 2 a hunter resting against a tree, with his
indispensable canine companion, calls to mind Gilbert's memory in later years.
"I spent many happy hours in the fields and forests with my dog and my gun."23
And how could a man so learned in the arts have made no mention of Winslow
Homer's "A Huntsman and Dogs."24 Canine portraitists Maude Earl2 5 and John
Emms2 6 deserved a nod as well.
But back to the insights that Gilbert did include:
Among many of the most beautiful of nature's plants and trees,
we have the dog-wood, dog-daisy, dog-laurel, dog-rose, dog-
violet, and the like; there are dog days; the dog watch (on ship
board); there is dogma, doggery, dog-latin, and the "dogged"; as
Shakespeare wrote: "Doth dogged war bristle his angry crest and
snarl in the gentle eyes of peace." King John, act IV, scene 3.
Holy Writ abounds with his mention, as, "A living dog is better
than a dead lion," Ecclesiastes, ix:4. "Who loves me loves my
dog" is a French proverb of the thirteenth century, and in
substance has figured in the literature of many writers, including
St. Bernard, of Clairvaux and Erasmus.27
The Justice from Georgia further eminded us that:
20. Id.
21. "Breaking Home Ties" (1890) PHILADELPHIA MUSEUM OF ART, American Art, Gallery 111
http://Philamuseum.org/collections/permanent.
22. "Portrait of Alfred B6rard with His Dog" (1881) PHILADELPHIA MUSEUM OF ART, European Art
1850-1900, Gallery 161 http://Philamuseum.org/collections/permanent.
23. Gilbert, supra note 13 at 15.
24. "A Huntsman and Dogs" (1891) PHILADELPHIA MUSEUM OF ART, American Art, Gallery 111
http://Philamuseum.org/collections/permanent.
25. "Maude Earl" WIKIPEDIA, https:/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maude Earl (last visited Mar., 30, 2016).
26. "John Emms" WIKIPEDIA, https:/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John Emms_(artist) (last visited Mar., 30,
2016).
27. Montgomery v. Maryland Casualty Co., 151 S.E. 363 (Ga. 1930).
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[p]oets great and small, their pens inspired by the Olympic maid,
have paid tribute to the dog. Lord Byron, who was devoted to
his "Boatswain," wrote him:
"But the poor dog, in life the firmest friend,
The first to welcome, foremost to defend,
Whose honest heart is still his master's own,
Who labors, fights, lives, breathes for him alone."
And again:
"'Tis sweet to hear the watch dog's honest bark
Bay deep mouthed welcome as we draw near home."2 8
And, of course, more Shakespeare:
The great bard of Avon, in his Julius Caesar, makes Brutus, say,
"I had rather be a dog and bay the moon, than such a Roman."
And in Macbeth Shakespeare gives us quite a catalogue of dogs:
"Hounds and greyhounds, mongrels, spaniels, shoughs, water-
rugs and demi-wolves; the swift, the slow, the subtle, the
housekeeper, the hunter." And in Midsummer Night's Dream,
speaking of hounds, he says: "Their heads are hung with ears
that sweep away the morning dew; crook-knee'd and dew-lapp'd
like Thessalian bulls; slow in pursuit, but match'd in mouth like
bells, each unto each:
"Such gallant chiding; for, beside the groves,
The skies, the fountains, every region near
Seem'd all one mutual cry. I never heard
So musical a discord, such sweet thunder."
In modem times Thompson, in "Major Jones' Courtship," makes
his hero to boast of owning two of the best coon dogs in the
settlement, describes the music they make in pursuit, and
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"'I never herd sich powerful discord,
Sich sweet thunder."DD'2 9
And other poets of whose heritage goes back to the British Isles:
Sir John Lucas, in a poem "To a Dog," pictures his "wraith in a
canine paradise" where the
"*** little faithful barking ghost
May leap to lick my phantom hand."
And so with other poets almost without number, among whom
are Chaucer, Sir Walter Scott, Alexander Pope, Kipling,
Trowbridge, Ruskin, and of course Stephen 0. Foster, the author
of so many beautiful southern melodies. It was he who wrote of
"Old Dog Tray":
"Old dog Tray's ever faithful;
Grief cannot drive him away;
He is gentle, he is kind-
I shall never never find
A better friend than old dog Tray."30
Back to the glory that was Greece:
Some 3,000 years before Christ Socrates wrote [31]: "When I see
some men, I love my dog the more."
Baron Curvier considered the dog "the most complete, the most
singular and the most useful conquest man has gained in the
animal world."
Xanthippus, father of Pericles, had a dog, which leaped into the
sea and swam along the galley side to follow his master, but
finally fainted and died away near the island of Salamis. And
Plutarch says: "That spot in the island which is still called the
Dog's Grave is said to be his."
29. Id. at 365.
30. Id.
31. Of course, we have no evidence that Socrates ever wrote anything. What we know of what Socrates
thought and said is a function of Plato having taken down the words of his great teacher.
272
PRA TICAL BENEFITS OF LITERATURE IN LAW
It is said that dogs bore their part in the siege of Troy, at
Marathon, and in the battle of Salamis.
Herodotus said: "In whatsoever house a cat has died by a natural
death, all those who dwell in this house shave their eyebrows
only; but those in whose house a dog has died, shave their whole
bodies."
Alcibiades' dog is now represented in marble at Duncombe Hall,
England.32
Gilbert then doubled back to the noble canines of the ancients and those not so
ancient:
There was Prince Llewellyn and his greyhound "Gelert"; Sir
Isaac Newton and his "Diamond"; Mirabeau and his "Chico";
"Diomed," about whom his master, John S. Wise, wrote a book;
Josephine and her "Fortune" that left a scar on Napoleon's leg;
and Sir Walter Scott and his dozens of dogs.
Relics of dogs were found among the ruins of Herculaneum
beside the forms of Roman sentries. In the late World War the
dog shared the dangers of their soldier-masters in flood and field
and trench.
Lord Byron had graven on a marble shaft his tribute to his dog:
"Near this spot is deposited the remains of one who possessed
beauty without vanity, strength without insolence, courage
without ferocity, and all the virtues of man without his vices.
This praise, which would be but meaningless flattery, if
inscribed over human ashes, is but a just tribute to the memory
of Boatswain, a dog, who was born at Newfoundland, 1803, and
died at Newstead Abbey, November 18, 1808."33
And to political leaders and judges:
In like vein Alexander H. Stephens wrote for his sagacious
poodle Rio: "Here rest the remains of what in life was a satire on
the human race, and an honor to his own-a faithful dog."
Senator George Graham Vest said: "The one, absolute, unselfish
friend that man can have in this selfish world, the one that never
deserts him, the one that never proves ungrateful or treacherous,
is his dog."
32. Montgomery, 151 S.E. at 365.
33. Id.
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Tributes might be multiplied almost without number. Like man,
not all dogs are good dogs. They have left behind them records
showing every degree of good and bad. One poet's commentary
has been judicially recognized in Woodbridge v. Marks, 14
Misc. Rep. 368, 36 N. Y. S. 81, 82:
"That dogs delight to bark and bite,
For God hath made them so."
In the case just cited it was said:
"Conceding the highest place here or hereafter to this
companion of man which is claimed by any one, even to
the faith of the Indian:
"'That in the happy hunting grounds
His faithful dog shall bear him company.'
"Still in the walks of life he must give way to the
interests of man."
For further judicial discussion, see State v. Langford, 55 S. C.
322, 33 S. E. 370, 74 Am. St. Rep. 746; Wiley v. State, 22 Barb.
(N. Y.) 506; Strong v. Georgia Ry., etc., Co., 118 Ga. 515, 45 S.
E. 366.34
Acknowledging his sources:
For many of the facts stated above, [Gilbert gives] credit . .. to
"Pippa Passes, And Rather Doggily," a little classic by William
C. Jones, from which I quote as follows: "When the house is still
and only the wind is abroad, Pippa muses by the fire at her
master's feet, black muzzle white paws, ands in her eyes that
question which troubled the soul of Tamas Carlyle, 'Is the
universe friendly or nay?' The hearth is red, fleecy the rug, the
shadows flickering warm; but Pippa is too staunch a terrier to
leave danger or doubt unchallenged. She sniffs the unseen, then
turns a more disquieted glance to the being in the chair. That
damp, twitching nose senses truth beyond the oracle of his book,
news beyond his radio's find. A growl, snarls, a rush to the
window, a dash to the locked door. She lunges and scratches,
and leaps, back bristled, flanks heaving, teeth snapping, in her
throat a hubbub that would rejoice the heart of three-headed
34. Id.
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Cerberus. The master is roused. What skulker, what power of
darkness? A witch, perchance. Worse! It is that ancient
anathema of a good dog's world, the dragon that would upset all
seven of the tailwagging heavens; it is Grimalkin, the Stray Cat.
A wild charge to the back fence, followed by a ferreting of every
nook which might harbor the foe, so placates Pippa that she
returns with tail as high as a bobbed tail well could be, and soon
is aslumber on the rug. *** When a dutiful ox dies, no epitaph is
writ; rather he is flayed for the parsimonious tanner. When a
mule goes the way of all flesh, no mound is reared, serviceful
though his years have been. When a lambkin lies still and stark
on the trencher, even the poet who was wont to rhyme on the
pretty innocent will regale himself with one of its chops. But
when a certain little creature, having a bark at one end and a bit
of tail at the other, with a flea or two between, takes leave for
the isles of the blest, the lords of earth look foolish while their
ladies weep, and humanity feels a tug at the heart."
A recent story, "Hound of Heaven," tells of a fox terrier after
death, floating through the clouds, the cold winds blowing
through his whiskers, finally landing at the pearly gates of
canine heaven, and fresh upon his admission he is engaged in
mortal combat with "Hodge," the famous cat, pet of Samuel
Johnson.35
In the end, the decision:
From what has been said it will not be difficult to ascertain
where the sentiment and inclination of the court would lead.
The court, however, is a court for the correction of errors and we
must be guided by the law. The law of the case will be found in
the headnotes.36
I do not doubt the watchman's widow was disappointed in the decision.
She had probably been told by her lawyer that the case was a long shot. The
lawyer showed fidelity to his public professional responsibility by pursuing the
widow's case all the way, as his fee was almost certainly contingent upon
success. Gilbert understood that the court had before it a sad happening for all, a
tragic circumstance for the widow. Still, he faithfully applied the law. If a
valuable piece of the employer's boat repair equipment had fallen into the water,
and the watchman perished while trying to recover it, the widow's claim would
no doubt have succeeded. That the law cuts square corners that the courts should
respect does not mean judges do not realize they are making decisions that will
be tough for some to swallow. A court's public disclosure of the humanity of
35. Id. at 365-66.
36. Id. at 366.
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the matter for decision is within the highest traditions of the judiciary. It
enhances the credibility of the judgments of all courts. What Price Gilbert did
would have been difficult, if not impossible, without resort to the literature and
lore of human history.37
III. WHAT MAKES FOR A GOOD ADJUDICATIVE OPINION?
A. The Practical Need for Humanizing the Blunt Instrument We Call Law
Law is a social fact. Its efficacy turns on its acceptance by the community
and by the country.38 Credibility of the opinions of judges promotes acceptance
of legal practice. Of course, credibility at its core turns on how close the
adjudicative opinion comes to marshalling full facts and data, identifying-
understanding-and eclaring the appropriate rules of law, and reliably applying
the law to the facts. This is no mechanical process,39 and speeding ticket
precision is seldom possible. Often overlooked is that the credibility-and
acceptance-of an adjudication also turns on the extent to which the judge
shows that he senses the humanity of the matter. There are cases that can be
decided only one way. There are few cases where there is not at least something
that should be said for the losing party. There are no cases that do not arise from
human activity and experience.
Credibility is enhanced when judges put their points well, but good writing
does not come easy to judges (nor to the young law clerks who ghost draft
ninety-plus per cent of so many opinions). More often than not, men and women
emerge from law school with their writing skills impaired, not enhanced. Those
skills take a further hit from the current culture of legal practice until, with one
rationalization or another, the soon not quite so young lawyer is assigning the
writing component of his or her practice to a paralegal or a new fresh caught
lawyer. The river rolls on. I've heard judges argue the relative unimportance of
the writing aspect of judging as compared with all else. One way or another, the
judge's chambers should learn to convey a written sense of the practical human
reality in each case adjudged-and do it with a touch of style.
Well written opinions are important for those affected, to those in the
jurisdiction who (often with the advice of counsel) want to know how to order
their affairs. Practical reality is also important to those interested persons not
quite so sure of the nuances of the rule of law, to those whose sense of justice
37. As best I can discern, Gilbert's opinion has been mentioned but once in his home state, Ward v.
Benge, 136 S.E.2d 911, 912 (Ga. App. 1964), with citations to three nice earlier cases involving dogs, but
nothing beyond case cites. The Court of Appeals of Maryland gave Justice Gilbert's effort a friendly nod in
State v. Collins, 790 A.2d 660, 671-672 (Md. 2002). Miller v. Clark County, 340 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2003)
involved a sheriffs deputy's use of a police dog to "bite and hold" the arm of a car theft suspect. The question
in the civil action was whether this use of the police dog was excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.
Judge Ronald C. Gould had a lengthy footnote about the "value to human society of skilled police dogs." Id. at
967 fn. 13. Montgomery is among the dog cases included. The footnote is pleasant reading but doesn't seem to
fit and enrich the adjudication at hand nearly so well as Gilbert's Montgomery opinion.
38. H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 100-110 (2d. ed. 1994).
39. This is the core concern of my recent polemic: James L. Robertson, Variations on a Theme By
Posner: Facing the Factual Component of the Reliability Imperative in the Process of Adjudication, 84 MISS.
L. J. 471 (2015).
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includes hopeful feelings about the law, that on balance it does us more good
than harm. Such feelings come when judges show their understanding of the
humanity of the matter at hand. One cannot show such understanding without
having that understanding; this is one few can fake. Margaret V. Turano puts the
point, "Lawyers and judges need to understand the lives of the human beings
they deal with."40 She follows with Samuel Johnson's definition of law as
"human wisdom acting upon human experience for the benefit of the public." 41
Law, after all, "is not an art or a science, but a service,"42 a service to humanity.
What I say here is not inconsistent with my sober sense that in the real
world the stuff we call law is a blunt instrument, in every real and practical sense
of the proverb, that is all too often less than reliably brought to bear.43
Humanity lives with the most sobering reality of them all-that law and legal
practice at best seldom yield but a crude approximation of justice and that these
seldom function at their best.44 How many times have you heard it said that in
most lawsuits everyone loses, and the practical question is who can emerge
having lost the least?
I understand this, though I do not doubt we are a better community for our
law and legal system-warts and all-than we should be without them. We
should make our way out of the law's fog, and look to the light of literature and
in it well-worded reflections on humanity. Luminous literature abounds, penned
by the poet, the essayist, the polemicist, the novelist, the playwright and even by
judges. "The cat will me[o]w and [every] dog will have his day."45
B. Modest Profits from a Practical Dose ofLiterature in Law
The latter part of the 20th Century saw the rise of lots of "law and"
movements, foremost the field of law and economics. Law and literature have
long learned from each other. They began to be discussed together a bit more
often in the 1980s, and much has been said since.46 I am not trying to enter that
conversation as I understand it, certainly not to fill perceived gaps, add insights,
or correct the errors of others. Some may see a connection between what I say
here and with what appears a loosely organized field where many go off in
directions that do not interest me.47 I am aware of the activity and have a
40. Margaret V. Turano, Moments of Grace: Lawyers Reading Literature, 72 N.Y. ST. BAR J. 12, 14
(2000).
41. Id. at 15.
42. RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 354 (2013).
43. Robertson, Variations, supra note 39, at 501-09.
44. I have sensed this for years, and said it many times, though in slightly differing ways. See James L.
Robertson, A Life Sentence Served by an Innocent Man, CAP. AREA B. ASS'N NEWSL. (CABA, Jackson, Miss.),
June 2011, at 8, 10, http://www.caba.ms/newsletters/caba-newsletter-june20l1.pdf
45. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 5, sc.1, In 315.
46. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE (3rd ed. 2009). John M. DeStefano III, On
Literature as Legal Authority, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 521 (2007) will reward reading; bear in mind that he is
speaking of an earlier edition of Judge Posner's work. I have already mentioned Keyes, supra note 3 and Prof.
Turano, supra note 40. See also Law and Humanities Institute, "Law and Literature Scholarship: A
Chronological Bibliography, http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/dsolove/LHI-Bibliography.htm (last visited Mar.
30, 2016); "Law and Humanities Blog: A Blog about Law, Literature, and the Humanities,
http://lawlit.blogspot.com/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
47. Most of Keyes' article is a critique and refutation of larger claims of others for the use of literary
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passing acquaintance with its offerings.
People associated literature and law long before the "law and"
movements.48  We have always had literate lawyers-Thomas Jefferson,
Abraham Lincoln, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,4 9 Clarence Darrow,5 0 William
Alexander Percy,5 1 and many others. Reliable judging is about communication,
and it is about persuasion, whatever else it may also be about. Few lawyers can
"write like an angel," once said of Cardozo,52 or like Learned Hand or Robert
Jackson. Holmes wrote with a particular grace and civility, and he could be
brief. Rhetorical brevity persuades where turgid logic, however impeccable,
leaves us unmoved. Use of literature can help, though at best it only sets a tone,
gives the reader pleasure, and otherwise enhances practical acceptance of the
adjudication and its ultimate reliability.
I take it as a given that writing well and with clarity is a function of one
reading what has been written well over the centuries. I knew this before the
summer of 1962 when I received the package called "Things To Do Before
Beginning Law School," or some such, and being told to read, among others,
BILLY BUDD by Herman Melville, THE Ox Bow INCIDENT by Walter Van
Tilborg Clark, and THE TRIAL by Franz Kafka. These works had not been
assigned just because they were well written, although each was well written
(and one translated into English), albeit in styles differing from the other two. I
had learned enough in high school to sense that "brush up your Shakespeare, and
start doing it now" 53 was advice appropriate perennially, as "man's inhumanity
to man"54 has been and is an activity without beginning or end. This assignment
gave a jump start to my journey toward understanding the ambiguity of all things
human.
The practical value of literature in adjudications can be like that of
legislative facts, or, perhaps I should say, more in the nature of a source of the
ideas and information that fall under that amorphous umbrella called legislative
facts, at least since the day of Kenneth Culp Davis.5 5 Holmes called these "the
techniques in law. Keyes, supra note 3. Posner has held forth at greater length on a broader range of such
claims, claims that strike me facially as without merit, though I do not believe either is giving the late Ronald
Dworkin his due. Lawyers have such a hard time presenting fairly the works of those with whom they
disagree, and doubtless I am as bad as others. Unlike some, I confess error I am forced to face. A generation
ago, I studied and taught Dworkin, particularly LAW'S EMPIRE, and with great profit and pleasure. RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1988).
48. And, as well, long before the two volume I: THE WORLD OF LAW, THE LAW IN LITERATURE
(Ephraim London ed. 1960) and II: THE WORLD OF LAW, THE LAW AS LITERATURE (Ephraim London ed.
1960). And before that Cardozo's LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES, SELECTED
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 339 (1938).
49. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES (Richard Posner ed. 1989).
50. CLARENCE DARROW, THE STORY OF MY LIFE, Chapter 35, A Year In Europe (De Capo Press 1996)
(1932).
51. W. A. PERCY, LANTERNS ON THE LEVEE (1940).
52. SANFORD LAKOFF, MAX LERNER; PILGRIM IN THE PROMISED LAND 87 (1998).
53. COLE PORTER, KISS ME, KATE (1948).
54. Robert Burns, "Man was made to mourn: A Dirge" (1784).
55. I have recently set forth at some length my thoughts on the role of legislative facts in the reliability
imperative that to my mind is categorically an inexorable part of the process of adjudication. Robertson,
Variations, supra note 39.
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secret root from which the law draws all of the juices of life." 56 Appropriate
literary allusions may enrich a judge's sense of a case, that something should be
done, and with an idea or two what that something might be. And of the
adjudicative narrative that should follow. I share James Boyd White's view that
"the law ... works by narrative."57  A sense of the humanity of all affected
people, and of the four dimensional fixes in which they find themselves in space-
time. This becomes important if you sense I may be right when I say that many
appeals can be decided in two or more ways without intellectual dishonesty on
the part of the writing judge.58
Many fear legal language. A lawyer never uses one word when two or
three will do just as well. Faulknerian sentences abound but seldom with grace
or poetic effect, or intelligibility to the uninitiated. The best legal writers
befuddle many; resort outside the law often aids understanding. When Edmund
Tyrone a/k/a Eugene O'Neill remembered his days at sea, reflecting that "I
belonged, without past or future, within peace and unity and a wild joy, without
something greater than my own life, or the life of Man, to Life itself! To God, if
you want to put it that way,"59 his autobiographical father suggested "there's the
makings of a poet in you." The son responded, "No. . .. I just stammered.
That's the best I'll ever do. . . . Stammering is the native eloquence of us fog
people."60
Lawyers and judges stammer, too. And worse, as when judges tell men to
turn square corners.6 1 Firing off legalese leaves less penetrable the language of
lawyers and judges, enhances their repute as fog people remote from humanity.
It impairs acceptance of their arguments, opinions and judgments. Fog can
permeate a city, a courthouse, a court and its mind, its proceedings and
judgments.62 Lest we forget, the Kafkaesque nightmare has its origin in a trial. 63
C. The Story-Telling Nature and Needs of Good Adjudications
Understanding is important, for those who come across the opinion of the
56. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 35 (1881). The above is but a line in the four
page passage with which Holmes concludes Lecture I, appearing in its entirety at pages 34-38, which should be
required reading, if not memorization, for all appellate judges.
57. JAMES BOYD WHITE, Telling Stories in the Law and in Ordinary Life: The Orestia and "Noon
Wines, " in HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 168 (1985).
58. Robertson, Variations, supra note 39, at 486-87.
59. EUGENE O'NEILL, LONG DAY'S JOURNEY INTO NIGHT, act 4, in EUGENE O'NEILL, COMPLETE
PLAYS, 1932-1943, at 812 (Library of America 1988).
60. Id. at 812-813.
61. See, e.g., Rock Island, Arkansas and Louisiana Railroad v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920)
(Holmes, J.) ("Men must turn square corners when they deal with the government."); FMC Stores v. Borough
of Morris Plains, 100 N. J. 418 (1985).
62. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 1-2 (1853).
63. FRANz KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Schocken Books, 1998) is one of a number of English translations
available. The Court of Appeals of Georgia makes a nice use of this one in the context of explaining why
service of process really is necessary before a defendant may be proceeded against, viz., without process "all
that would be necessary to obtain a judgment and levy on a man's property and possessions would be to inform
him by whatsoever means that there was in fact a suit pending against him, and throw the burden on him of
checking out the rumor, a situation that would indeed lead to the nightmare situations envisioned by Kafka in
The Trial." Holloway v. Frey, 202 S.E.2d 845, 847 (Ga. App. 1973).
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court a generation after the fact, when memory of the brouhaha that gave rise to
the case has dissipated or been forgotten. Comfort in reading facilitates
understanding. A conversational tone can be a godsend, easing the way to all
else, and it can keep the reader reading.
People tend to believe a lot of storytelling goes on in the courthouse, as well
it should, so long as we are clear about the sorts of stories that are allowable.
Professor White reminds us that story telling takes place at each stage of a case,
from "the story the client tells . . . . It ends in story, too, with a decision by a
court or jury, or an agreement between the parties, about what happened and
what it means."64 Then the "final legal version of the story [which] almost
always includes a decision or an agreement about what is to remain unsaid.
Beyond the story is a silence it acknowledges."65
Richard Posner has a useful exposition that he calls "Legal Narratology."66
There is common sense in Posner's point that adjudicative opinions should
respect "craft values . . ., notably impartiality. . ., scrupulousness and
concreteness".67 The traditional res gestae rule is alive and well in my home
state,68 though it has not been formally brought forward in the Mississippi Rules
of Evidence.
Rules require that appellate briefs state the facts.69 I have often urged
young lawyers to write their statement of the facts as a free-standing narrative.
The idea is to present the facts so that a reader with an ordinary sense of justice
reading only that narrative, and if there were no law to the contrary, would feel
that your client has the better of the case.7 0 No lawyer can do this without a
strong sense of humanity. It is a bit more difficult today, as rules try to constrain
fact statements to the issues presented. Still, a good writer should be able to slip
congenial allusions, phrases, and even paragraphs past the negative vigilance of
the gate keepers who check the briefs for form.
With a touch of stealth, one should be able to practice good narrative
writing style without incurring the wrath of those well-meaning but
unimaginative souls who people our appellate courts. In no event should the
record be distorted or bad facts left out, lest your adversary pounce upon them.
Keep an eye on the question the court should decide. The stories of most flawed
and all too human litigants can be told so that the reading judge will feel a tug
their way before the first word of law is brought to bear.
Similarly, the opinions of judges, particularly appellate judges, should be
64. WHITE, supra note 57.
65. Id.
66. POSNER, LAW, supra note 46.
67. Id. at 424.
68. See VICTORIA C. FERREIRA, MISSISSIPPI EVIDENCE 65 & n.23 (4th ed. 2001); see also Burleson v.
State, 166 So. 3d 499, 511 (¶36) (Miss. 2015); Batiste v. State, 121 So. 3d 808, 831-832 (¶33) (Miss. 2013);
Wade v. State, 583 So. 2d 965, 967 (Miss. 1991); Collins v. State, 513 So. 2d 877, 879 (Miss. 1987);
Hemmingway v. State, 483 So. 2d 1335, 1337 (Miss. 1987); Anderson v. State, 154 So. 3d 42, 56 fn. 6 (¶44)
(Miss. Ct. App 2014); Parks v. State, 950 So. 2d 184, 187 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006); Townsend v. State, 933
So. 2d 986, 991 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
69. FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(6); MISS. R. APP. P. 28(a)(4).
70. This approach is hardly original with me. I heard it years ago, perhaps in law school, or in some
reading long since forgotten, except as to substance.
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presented in narrative form. I have said before that:
every appeal includes a story worth telling, and worth telling as
well as it may be told, because each case is about flawed and
hopeful people worth caring about even when it is also about the
entities and institutions they have created, the prejudices they
profess, the mistakes they have made, or the meanness of their
manners.71
In telling the stories of their clients:
[c]ounsel may draw upon literature, history, science, religion,
and philosophy for material for his argument. He may navigate
all rivers of modem literature or sail the seas of ancient learning;
he may explore all the shores of thought and experience; he
may, if he will, take the wings of the morning and fly not only to
the uttermost parts of the sea but to the uttermost limits of space
in search of illustrations, similes, and metaphors to adom his
argument. He may reach the uttermost heights of attainable
eloquence, soar into the empyrean heights where his shadow
may fall on the loftiest mountain top, as the eagle in its loftiest
flight. He may borrow from every source, modem and ancient,
such materials as he needs for his argument. He may clothe the
common occurrences of life in the habiliments of poetry and
give to airy nothings a habitation and a name. He may weave of
words a rhetorical bouquet that enchants the ear and mesmerizes
the mind. He may make the learning of the ages the servant of
his tongue. His argument may be as profound as logic and
learning can make them. He may give wing to his wit and play
to his imagination so long as he does not imagine fact not in
evidence, which the court does not take judicial knowledge of,
or does not go out of the record for the facts not in evidence. [72]
... As to the facts in evidence, he may array them in such
figures and form and clothe them with such ideas and
conclusions as he can conjure up in his mind for the best interest
of his cause.73
Many believe that this oft-quoted text was plagiarized from the brief said to
have emanated with the pen of lawyer/poet William Alexander Percy, the
historical poet laureate of the Mississippi Delta.74 In Mississippi, it has become
71. Robertson, Variations, supra note 39, at 488.
72. This wonderful 1930 judicial utterance was penned before there was thought of what has become
today's understanding of legislative facts, which emerged like Athena from the head of Zeus with the original
Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. EVID. 201 (1972 Proposed Rules).
73. Nelms & Blum v. Fink, 131 So. 817, 820-21 (Miss. 1930).
74. See James L. Robertson, Captain Percy, Patriot, CAP. AREA B. ASS'N NEWSL. (CABA, Jackson,
Miss.), (October 2012), at 6, http://www.caba.ms/newsletters/caba-newsletter-october20l2.pdf. Formally,
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the canonical statement of the nature and scope of final argument at trial, brought
forward in substantial part in later cases.75
If lawyers have such latitude, such encouragement as in Nelms & Blum, so
do judges, and even more so-particularly appellate judges not constrained to
point a particular jury in a particular case to a particular verdict, but rather to
penetrate the fog or soar above it. Optimal reliability in fact is our end game in
the practice of adjudications.7 6 Adjudications enjoy optimal credibility with the
rest of us when judges care enough to use well the gift of language to explain
their rulings reliably. Of course, that means no analytical gaps in judicial
opinions: no "2 plus 4 plus x plus y plus z equals 21" logic, a structural flaw in
so many reported appellate adjudications. Many opinions convey no sense the
judge sees that the x, y and z steps are even there. I hope to go beyond that
practical goal today, to talk of ways to "clothe the common occurrences of life in
the habiliments of poetry [. . . , to] weave of words a rhetorical bouquet that
enchants the ear and mesmerizes the mind." 77
D. Knowing the Multiple Audiences that Appellate Judges Write For
Appellate judges write for a number of audiences, audiences with differing
needs and interests.7 8 Not every opinion should be directed to the same
audience. Some should be directed to multiple audiences with quite different
interests, needs, and abilities to understand the case. One interested consumer
may be annoyed that the opinion speaks to others with differing needs and
interests, but that consumer has a complaint only if his needs and interests are
not addressed. Appellate opinions should be organized so that the consumer can
readily identify the parts he needs and fast forward past the rest.
The appellate judge writes for the parties. The opinion should show that the
court understands the activity that gave rise to the case. It should decide the case
concretely and tell the parties how so and why. I was among those judges often
accused of setting out the facts beyond the bare minimum necessary that the
legal analysis could be understood. My defense is that setting out the facts at
length has a disciplinary effect. It helped me make sure I had not skimmed
across the top too quickly, that I had not been too blinded by dubious deference
standards.79
Setting out the facts at length also says to the parties that the judge cares
what happened that led to the litigation.80 Not that the unsuccessful party is
Nelms & Blum was authored by Justice George H. Ethridge, in his day the most literate member of the Supreme
Court of Mississippi, but with a literary style noticeably different from Percy's.
75. See, e.g., Dycus, 875 So. 2d at 172 (¶160); Profit Mgt. Development, Inc. v. Jacobson, Brandvik and
Anderson, Ltd., 721 N.E.2d 826, 839 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); Brewer v. State, 704 So. 2d 70, 73 (¶19) (Miss.
1997); Williams v. State, 595 So. 2d 1299, 1309 (Miss. 1992); Shell v. State, 553 So. 2d 887, 899 (Miss. 1989);
Johnson v. State, 416 So. 2d 383, 391-392 (Miss. 1980); Gray v. State, 351 So. 2d 1342, 1346 (Miss. 1977).
76. This is the central thesis of my lengthy exposition in Robertson, Variations, supra note 39. Today's
effort is about one means appropriate in some cases to the end of optimal reliability in adjudications.
77. Nelms & Blum, 131 So. at 820-21.
78. See discussion in DeStefano, supra note 46, at 525-26.
79. See, e.g., Harveston v. State, 493 So. 2d 365, 366-70, 371-73 (Miss. 1986) (Robertson, J., in a prior
life); see also Robertson, Variations, supra note 39, at 552-564.
80. I do not mean to imply that this is easy. Getting the facts right is so very important, particularly on
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going to be persuaded; you should strive for the "'A' for effort" though you
know it will seldom be bestowed. I always thought, if you were going to tell a
man he had to spend ten years in prison, that it was not asking too much that you
tell him why as well as practicable, and that you should start with a very clear
narrative statement of the facts of what he did that offended what particular
section of the criminal code and in what practical factual context. And, most
important, tell him why his defenses do not fly.
Of course, an appellate judge is always writing for fellow judges, first and
foremost to satisfy a majority of one's colleagues. I once sat on a court where,
with fewer than five votes, you were writing only to let off steam at the risk of
making clear the position the majority rejected. Past that, a judge writes for
others at the appellate level who in time might be called on to revise or extend
what the judge has written, and for those lower court judges who have to
understand and apply the law in never-quite-identical factual contexts.
Judges write for the bar as well. I recall times when I was writing to fill
gaps in what was already in the books, to make the next lawyer's or judge's task
a little easier. Three cases dealing with whether tidal or fresh waters were public
waters or were eligible for private ownership are particularly in point.8 ' In the
late 1980s, the history and lore and legislative facts of these matters were
available only in scattered and hard-to-find fragments. I went beyond the basics
to fill the gaps, each case building on the one before it. Lawyers and judges
handling such cases today have the research tools to revise and extend and
improve upon my efforts, as much, if not more, than I managed with what once
was all we had.
To return to a point above, Dycus v. Sillers is a long opinion. It is filled
with facts, history, potomology engineering, and more than a bit of literature, the
humanity of the culture of fishermen. The opinion is organized so that lawyers
and judges who on a particular day do not need all of these points may readily
identify, study and cite the particular points they do need.82
In many cases, I tried to write for the hypothetical average intelligent and
informed person on the streets who, for whatever reason, might need to read and
understand the case.83 As I have before, I take exception to Holmes when he
said:
The reason why a lawyer does not mention that his client wore a
white hat when he made a contract, while Mrs. Quickly would
those collateral facts that contribute to the humanity of the matter at hand, but are not critical to the precise
adjudication. Nothing impeaches the credibility of an opinion in the eyes of the unsuccessful party as much as
when he sees the court saying that the operative events occurred on January 10 of a particular year, when
everyone knows it all happened on June 10 of that year.
81. See Cinque Bambini P'ship v. State, 491 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988) (Public Tidelands Trust); Dycus, 557 So. 2d 486 (small man-made lake
off larger oxbow lake once a part of the Mississippi River), discussed below; Ryals v. Pigott, 580 So. 2d 1140
(Miss. 1990) (whether the waters of the Bogue Chitto River in southwest Mississippi were public vis a vis the
claims of riparian landowners).
82. See, e.g., Fulop v. Suta, 847 So. 2d 893, 898 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (Southwick, J.,
dissenting); Davis v. Davis, 643 So. 2d 931, 934 (Miss. 1994).
83. See Robertson, Variations, supra note 39, at 489, (citing and quoting POSNER, supra note 35).
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be sure to dwell upon it along with the parcel gilt goblet and the
sea-coal fire, is that he foresees that the public force will act in
the same way whatever his client had upon his head.8 4
But we want the case to be understandable by Mrs. Quickly, too, and to be
congenial as well. More broadly, reliability is enhanced when the r ader sees the
parties as people, and not mere automatons.85 Holmes proves too much, for
describing the way Mrs. Quickly would think of the parties changes nothing in
the way "the public force will act." 86 It rather enriches the opinion of the court,
as Holmes enriched his article.
Finally, the appellate judge is writing for the future. As a practical matter,
each adjudication has a forward-looking component. The rule of precedent
assures no less. This legislative dimension of the decision needs to be explained
as best can be. Sometimes it is enough to cite prior precedents that articulate the
point. Saying something that looks a bit ahead is important. Otherwise, the
case's meaning will be left for implication by others, albeit years removed from
the social milieu in which it arose and was decided, though all law by its nature
and practical import faces the challenge of "adapting life to the continuous
change in social and economic conditions."87 Given the advent of the Internet,
and the resources and technologies to come, I know only that more and wider
audiences soon will be able to access more readily what judges have done and
what those on the bench now and in the future will do. Beyond this, Chief
Justice Charles Evans Hughes once suggested that "a dissent in a court of last
resort is [sometimes written as] an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the
intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error
into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed.8 8
E. An Under-Used Strategy for Talking with Judicial Audiences
In time, I stumbled onto a mode for writing--in appropriate cases--an
opinion, that it would catch the eye of the media who would present attractive
reports of the court and the humanity of what it had done.89 With or without the
media's accelerant, the word spread, though I have no way of quantifying its
effect. With 20-20 hindsight, my efforts to tap into literature and related lore,
not altogether fictional, could stand a bit more polish. By and large, those who
may not have cared for my less traditional approach never let me know their
84. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897).
85. Robertson, Variations, supra note 39, at 608.
86. Id.
87. Albritton v. City of Winona, 178 So. 799, 805-06 (Miss. 1938).
88. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 67-68 (1928);
CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS AND DANIEL M. O'BRiEN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS; LAW, COURTS AND JUDICIAL
POLITICS (2013); see also Com. Of Pa. v. Local Union 542, Intern. Union of Operating Engineers, 388 F.Supp.
Charles 155, 175 fn. 37 (E. D. Pa. 1974); Prairie View A & M University v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 522
(Tex. 2012) (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting).
89. See below the story of Pharr v. State, 465 So. 2d 294 (Miss.1984), of City of Clinton v. Smith, 493
So. 2d 331 (Miss. 1986), and of Dycus v. Sillers, 557 So. 2d 486 (Miss. 1990). Others had practiced this
strategy years earlier. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Maryland Casualty Co., 151 S.E. 363, 364-66 (Ga. 1930). My
research skills in the mid-1980s were less than what they should have been.
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thoughts, with the exception of a few colleagues who never quite got it and said
so.90 The ever-present reality was that without five votes, my efforts were of no
avail.
III. FORMS OF LITERARY ALLUSIONS THAT THE LAW MAY USE WITH PROFIT
AND PLEASURE
A. Use ofFictional Characters
Lawyers and judges have long used the names of famous fictional
characters to make a point. Arthur Conan Doyle's larger-than-life, sharp-as-a-
tack detective Sherlock Holmes is a perennial choice, and in contexts that vary
almost as much as those Shakespeare makes available.9 1 In 1980, the Supreme
Court of the United States ("SCOTUS") wrote that, "[i]n ascertaining the
meaning of a statute, a court cannot, in the manner of Sherlock Holmes, pursue
the theory of the dog that did not bark."92 In 2006, a judge on the Fourth Circuit
disagreed, resorting to Holmes in dissent on a point of plain error:
The majority's observation about the silence of all Fourth
Circuit panels calls to mind the Sherlock Holmes mystery Silver
Blaze . . . . Holmes was investigating the theft of an expensive
race horse named Silver Blaze from a stable and the death of
Silver Blaze's trainer. Another investigator asked Holmes if
there was any particular aspect of the crime that was worthy of
attention .... Holmes ... pointed out that the failure of the
watch dog to bark when Silver Blaze was stolen showed that the
watch dog knew the thief . . . . As in Silver Blaze, the failure of
any Fourth Circuit panel applying Hughes and its progeny to
"bark" at the fourth step of the plain-error analysis is
compelling.93
Some judges make general references. "This may seem like an improbable
scenario, and doubtless it is, but Conan Doyle's writing about Sherlock Holmes
teach that, when all explanations of an occurrence are improbable, the more
improbable ones must be rejected and the least improbable accepted as true."94
"This is a very mysterious case. I don't know anybody short of a Sherlock
Holmes that could unravel it in a satisfactory manner."9 5
Years ago and not even in a criminal law context, the Supreme Court of
90. Pharr, 465 So. 2d at 305; City of Clinton, 493 So. 2d at 342; and Dycus, 557 So. 2d at 508-509.
91. Sherlock Holmes' eminence in literature and law is well known. See, e.g., POSNER, LAW, supra
note 46, at 419-24. Holmes video series are easily accessible. I advise the under fifty set that, while Benedict
Cumberbatch is entertaining and Basil Rathbone still has loyal devotees, Jeremy Brett is Sherlock Holmes.
Then read the stories.
92. Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 592 and fn. 8 (1980).
93. United States v. Smith, 443 F.3d 254, 280 (4th Cir. 2006) (dissenting opinion, citing ARTHUR
CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES, 335, 347, 349 (1927)).
94. Tilford v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 705 F.2d 828, 832 (6th Cir. 1983) (dissenting
opinion).
95. Hoover Motor Express, Inv. v. Thomas, 65 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Tenn. App. 1933).
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Mississippi explained that "[t]o impute negligence of the driver to the
appellee ... would be to require the quickness of thought and the vigilance of a
Sherlock Holmes."96 Likely readers got it when, for a change of pace, the court
later said, "The prescience of a Hercule Poirot was hardly requisite to a belief
that earlier that afternoon Gandy had been involved in unlawful cocaine
trafficking, ... .,"97 en route to deciding a point of probable cause. And likely
more so today, given David Suchet's charming portrayal that the BBC has made
widely available. Invoking Sherlock Holmes or, at times, Agatha Christie's
Hercule Poirot does not decide cases. When apt, such uses may save fifty or
more words in the opinion, or add a touch of color that makes the opinion
congenial to many readers with little risk of offending others.
Shakespeare's Shylock is another favorite. A good many years ago, a court
told a debtor he could quote Portia to his creditors, "[b]ut if, like Shylock, the
creditors should fail to appreciate the beauty of this advice, and should demand
to the utmost the pound of flesh, the law of Georgia, unlike that of Venice,
affords no avenue by which the unfortunate debtor can 'get back at' his
adversary."98 In an assault case where the victim was said to be "a usurer and a
loan shark," the court said, "[o]ur law affords one various means of dealing with
Shylock, but self help acts of violence are not among them."9 9 As with any such
exercise, judicial authors do not always take care that the image suggested by the
fictional name dropped fits the case, viz., "[t]he usurious toll which the majority
has imposed upon subsequent litigants who are in Mr. McCoy's position in the
interest of judicial economy and efficiency is a blatant deprivation of due process
reminiscent of Shylock and his pound of flesh."100
Other fictional figures make their appearance in the law reporters. Years
ago, the Supreme Court of Mississippi had struck down a Progressive Era
amendment to the state's constitution providing for a populist, California style
initiative and referendum legislative process, though the court acted on arguably
quite specious grounds.101 Almost seventy years later, the Attorney General
sought to resurrect of the old I & R amendment. Concluding its discussion of
the dubious decision of 1922, the court said, "[t]here the matter lay, dormant, for
lo these many years, a Rip Van Winkle or a Sleeping Beauty, depending on
one's point of view." 102 A year later the court again invoked Washington
Irving's best known character, viz., "the majority's ruling permits anyone having
a prior conviction used at the sentencing phase [of a capital murder trial] or for
enhanced punishment to use a Rip Van Winkle approach to circumvent [the]
plain statutory prescription of our post-conviction collateral relief act." 10 3
96. Columbus & Greenville Railway Co. v. Fondren, 121 So. 838, 842 (Miss. 1929).
97. Gandy v. State, 438 So. 2d 279, 283 (Miss. 1983).
98. Boston Mercantile Co. v. Ouldcarter Co., 51 S.E. 466, 468 (Ga. 1905).
99. Black v. State, 506 So. 2d 264, 267 (Miss. 1987).
100. McCoy v. Colonial Baking Company, Inc., 572 So. 2d 850, 864 (Miss. 1990) (dissenting opinion).
101. Power v. Robertson, 93 So. 769, 775-77 (Miss. 1922).
102. State ex. rel. Moore v. Molpus, 578 So. 2d 624, 630 (Miss. 1991).
103. Culberson v. State, 612 So. 2d 342, 346 (Miss. 1992).
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B. The Fictional Circumstances ofFictional Characters
Another case concerned the question of whether a search warrant for a
certain building reached private quarters separately occupied by another:
The use of the B suffix to indicate the address of private quarters in a larger
building is neither new nor unusual. . . . An old address of that type, and one
widely known among the English-speaking peoples of the world, is that of the
rooms occupied by Sherlock Holmes at 221B Baker Street, London.104
Fictional characters and their circumstances in familiar settings can enrich
an appellate opinion. Few educated in our public schools half a century ago
would miss the point, made in a neglected child case, when the court said, "we
are sensitive to the fact that, under the authority legalistically granted the Youth
Court in our Youth Court Act, Tom Sawyer could have been held a child in need
of supervision, in which event Muff Potter may have been hanged."0 5
In a different vein, the court drew from LES MISERABLES, when it stated,
"we agree with appellant that Inspector Javert's devotion to an immutable and
inexorable code of laws which categorically demanded and required punishment
is not the basic concept of law in this state. In passing, it was Javert's fanatical
dedication to his adamant belief which ultimately caused his self-destruction."106
Sabrina Suan was charged with assisting an inmate to escape.10 7 One question
was the arguable remoteness of her acts of assistance from another's act of
escape: "Whether Fauchelevent's secreting Jean Valjean in a convent after his
November 1823 bolt to freedom would be a violation of Section 97-9-29 is not
before us, although the Javerts of the world would surely press the point."'0 8
In a Terry stop drivers' license check, the officers found heroin.109 In
rejecting defendant's Fourth Amendment objections, the court explained that,
"[t]his is not an instance of an indefatigable Inspector Javert mercilessly
pursuing, harassing, and hounding his quarry through Paris sewers or Kendall
County highways by concocting excuses to detain him." 110  In 2013,
Minnesota's Justice Paul H. Anderson, speaking for himself and Justice Alan C.
Page,"'I made full and persuasive use of Inspector Javert and Jean Valjean to
articulate the injustice of the court's denying that it had inherent authority to
expunge the record of a young woman's forgery conviction.112 However
appealing and appropriate the analogy to Victor Hugo's powerful literary
creation, the point seems out of place where the issue was separation of powers
authority of the judicial branch, not the merits of the case. Of course, the lines of
demarcation between the branches of government are more of a continuum, so
that to some the story of Javert and Valjean may have been used with effect.
104. Mayes v. Till, 266 So. 2d 578, 580 (Miss. 1972).
105. In Interest of M.R L., M.L.L, and V.L., 488 So. 2d 788, 789 (Miss. 1986).
106. Jenkins v. Borodofsky, 211 So. 2d 874, 876 (Miss. 1968).
107. Suan v. State, 511 So. 2d 144, 146 (Miss. 1987).
108. Id. at 146. LES MISERABLES had opened on Broadway five months before Suan was handed down.
109. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
110. Id. at 66.
111. Yes, that Alan Page, former Purple People Eater with the Minnesota Vikings (1967-78), but a
Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota since 1993.
112. State v. M.D.T., 831 N.W.2d 276, 300-02 (Minn. 2013) (Anderson, P., dissenting).
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C. Fictional Cases
Fictional cases commonly known can make a point, though as with non-
fictional citations of authority, the potency of the point flows from the factual
and procedural proximity of the case cited. In 1959, Justice Tom Clark
concluded a brief opinion thusly:
Much has been said of late of the law's delay,113 and criticism
heaped on the courts for it. This case affords a likely Exhibit A.
It looks as if Scales' case, like Jandyce v. Jandyce, will go on
forever, only for the petitioner to reach his remedy, as did
Richard Carstone there, through disposition by the Lord.114
Chief Judge Boyce Martin of the Sixth Circuit used a lengthy quotation
from BLEAK HOUSE to punctuate his dissent in a case involving a ten year
delay.115
Closer to home, we find "This is the third appearance of this case before
this court. It bids fair to rival the famous fictional case of Jandyce v.
Jarndyce . . . , but we venture the hope that its issues will somehow be finally
determined before reaching the tragic consummation there described."11 6 In a
prior life, I once likened the process in a case to Jandyce v. Jandyce and then
eased a few of Dickens' lines into my concurring opinion.117
The core substantive issue in State ex rel. Collins v. Jones118 was whether
Mississippi should make a Progressive Era return to an elective judiciary. The
war was waged on grounds of constitutional stare decisis, the amendment
process having been before the supreme court in 1900, fourteen years earlier.119
Justice Sam C. Cook closed his dissent with Shakespeare:
In the celebrated case of Shylock v. Antonio, Bassanio makes a
powerful appeal to the judge to depart from the fixed rules and
find a rule to fit the special case. I quote the appeal and the reply
of the wise and just judge, viz:
Bassanio: And I beseech you, Wrest once the law to
your authority: To do a great right, do a little wrong,
And curb this cruel devil of his will.
113. Recall a line from Hamlet's famous soliloquy, viz.: "For who would bear the whips and scorns of
time, the oppressor's wrong, the proud man's contumely, the pangs of despised love, the law's delay [etc.]."
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1, Ins. 70-72 (emphasis added). See infra note 162.
114. Scales v. United States, 360 U.S. 924, 926 (1959) (citing in n.2 the well-known fictional and forever
litigation at the center of Charles Dickens' BLEAK HOUSE (1853)).
115. Becherer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith Inc., 193 F.3d 415, 444 (6th Cir. 1999) (Marin,
Jr., B., dissenting).
116. Armstrong v. Jones, 22 So. 2d 7, 8 (Miss. 1945).
117. Jones by Jones v. Harris, 460 So. 2d 120, 123, 124, 126 (Miss. 1984) (three justice concurring
opinion).
118. State ex rel. Collins v. Jones, 64 So. 241, 256 (Miss. 1914).
119. State ex rel. McClurg v. Powell, 27 So. 927 (Miss. 1900).
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Portia: It must not be; there is no power in Venice Can
after a decree established: 'Twill be recorded for a
precedent, And many an error, by the same example,
Will rush into the state: It cannot be.12 0
Shakespeare's use of the King's English was as powerful as ever. Justice
Cook's selection of the passage to make his point was also on the mark. The
Jones majority no doubt sensed its sting, and stood firm.
D. Literary Insights into the Law
Judge Learned Hand's light still shines though it has been more than fifty
years since his service on the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit came
to a close. Of many Hand jewels of value in our context, one stands out:
I venture to believe that it is as important to a judge called to
pass on a question of constitutional law, to have at least a
bowing acquaintance with Acton and Maitland, with
Thucydides, Gibbon and Carlyle, with Homer, Dante,
Shakespeare, and Milton, with Machiavelli, Montaigne and
Rabelais, with Plato, Bacon, Hume and Kant, as with the books
which have been specifically written on the subject.121
I think of several names I would add. One was a generation younger but
outlived Hand by less than a year.
The law or the foibles thereof figure often in Faulkner's fiction.
Likely, few citizens have sensed the significance of the courthouse, as
did Faulkner, or expressed such sentiments so well:
But above all, the courthouse; the center, the focus, the hub;
sitting looming in the center of the county's circumference like a
single cloud in its ring of horizon, laying its vast shadow to the
uttermost rim of horizon; musing, brooding, symbolic and
ponderable, tall as cloud, solid as rock, dominating all; protector
of the weak, judiciate and curb of the passions and lusts,
repository and guardian of the aspirations and the hopes . . . .122
... [B]ecause it was theirs, bigger than any because it was the
sum of all, it must raise all of their hopes and aspirations level
120. State ex rel. Collins, 64 So. at 261 (Cook, J., dissenting) (quoting from WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1, Ins. 214-222).
121. LEARNED HAND, Sources of Tolerance, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
LEARNED HAND 66, 81 (Irving Dillard ed. 1952).
122. WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 35 (1950).
289
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
with its own aspirant and soaring cupola, so that, sweating and
tireless and unflagging, they would look about at one another a
little shyly, a little amazed, with something like humility too, as
if they were realising, or were for a moment at least capable of
believing, that men, all men, including themselves, were a little
better, purer maybe even, than they had thought, expected, or
even needed to be.12 3
I do not see how a person can read Faulkner and not, whenever in the
presence of a courthouse, feel a certain sense of awe and humility and pride and
thankfulness, and make a silent self-promise to do better. The courthouse
endures mischief and shenanigans, adjudications of doubtful reliability, and the
crude approximation of justice that people practice there, and it stand and
prevails.
E. A Pithy Quote Can Set the Tone, IfIt Fits
Quoting a non-legal source is one of the tricks of the trade; you avoid the
baggage all literate lawyers and judges have in some, sometimes many, quarters.
Preferably the quote is pithy and emanates from a source with clout. Literary
allusions should be chosen with the audience(s) in mind, though to the well-read
they come naturally.
In the context of a trial judge acting without notice to the parties, a Fifth
Circuit Judge steeped in the humanities wrote, "[t]hey [the litigants] cannot read
over the judge's shoulder, or penetrate his memory. Nor can we. From
Shakespeare's Hamlet to Albee's Tiny Alice, soliloquies and asides have been
shared with the audience."1 24 And in another case, "Indeed, after reading the
complaint, '[o]ne can hardly resist but to say 'something is rotten in [this] state'
of affairs."1 25
Other Shakespearean allusions have given pleasure though without carrying
the day. Counsel for an accused challenged the grammatical construction of the
indictment, focusing on "'a patently inappropriate period."'l26 This prompted
the defense to analogize the state's argument to Lady Macbeth's familiar "Out
damned spot! Out, I say!" to which yours truly, speaking for the court observed,
"[t]he retort would be telling in the classroom or in a court of the literati. Alas, it
has meager force in a court of law." 1 27 Defense counsel failed to see the limited
practical potency in a court of law of even an on-point quote from Shakespeare.
A few years earlier, a dissenting judge in my state publicly (and likely
123. Id. at 37 (1950). The body of Faulkner's work is a rich minefield of twisted, at times tortured and at
other times uplifting tales of humanity caught in legal conundrums. See, e.g., The Law and Southern Literature
Symposium, 4 MISS. C.L. REV. 165, 165-329 (Spring 1984), devoted almost entirely to Faulkner's work;
Michael A. Wolf, William Faulkner, Legal Commentator: Humanity and Endurance in Hollywood's
Yoknapatawpha, 77 Miss. L.J. 957 (2008).
124. Soley v. Star & Herald Co., 390 F.2d 364, 369-70 (5th Cir. 1968) (Goldberg, J.).
125. Courtemanche v. Bibbo, 2004 WL 2820943 at *8 (R.I. Sup. Ct. 2004) (alluding to WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 2, In. 90 ("[s]omething is rotten in the state of Denmark")).
126. Henderson v. State, 445 So. 2d 1364, 1367 (Miss. 1984).
127. Id. at 1367 (referring to WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 1, In. 38).
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knowingly) laid the veritable egg. The context was plaintiffs' request for
attorneys' fees after a successful Voting Rights Act challenge to Mississippi's
legislative apportionment.12 8 The majority awarded fees.129 Understand that
over the years, U.S. District Judge William Harold Cox had acquired the
reputation as a soft-spoken curmudgeon who opposed most rays of legal light
employed to penetrate what was once Mississippi's "closed society."l30
Dissenting from the fee award, Judge Cox quoted Macbeth, viz., "Life's but a
walking shadow, a poor player, That struts and frets his hour upon the stage, And
then is heard no more; it is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
signifying nothing."'31 As most, if not all, know, these words capture Macbeth's
reflection at being told of the death of that most evil dominatrix, Lady Macbeth.
Judge Cox knew all of this, and well knew his reputation; indeed, he seemed at
times to relish it, so that he cared not that his Connor dissent left lawyers and
many others chuckling that here was an instance for calling to mind the facts and
holding of the familiar case of Pot v. Kettle.
A literary allusion can have effect where it fits. Disparate judges and courts
have sensed a value in citing or quoting Walt Whitman's Song of the Open Road
to set a tone.132 The allusion must be chosen with care. Does it make and
strengthen the point, or, as with Judge Cox's passage from Macbeth, leave one
exposed to telling counter attack? Such allusions are a form of general
propositions that, without more, do not decide concrete cases,133 of which
Justice Holmes would say "I will admit any general proposition you like and
decide the case either way."' 34 Take the familiar question of whether some
judge-made rule of law should be changed. A quote often trotted out is from
Holmes, viz.:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
it was so laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past.135
No one has come along since Holmes who could use words with such
effect. One must be sure Holmes' quote works in the context proffered.
128. Connor v. Winter, 519 F.Supp. 1337 (S. D. Miss 1981).
129. Id. at 1344.
130. See JAMES W. SILVER, MISSISSIPPI: THE CLOSED SOCIETY (1964).
131. Connor, 519 F.Supp. at 1348 (Cox, W., dissenting) (citing and quoting WILIAM SHAKESPEARE,
MACBETH act 5, sc. 4, Ins. 24-28).
132. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972) (citing and quoting Vachel
Lindsay and Henry David Thoreau as well); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street., 367 U.S. 740, 775
(1961) (Douglas, J., concurring); Mayor and Aldermen of City of Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Printing and Publ'g
Co., 434 So. 2d 1333, 1336 (Miss. 1983) (Robertson, J., in a prior life).
133. Robertson, Variations, supra note 39, at 551 n.328, and accompanying text (citing, inter alia,
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
134. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., "Letter to HaroldLaski" Feb. 19, 1920, in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES 38
(Posner ed. 1992).
135. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
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Recently, Justice David E. Nahmias of the Georgia Supreme Court used it to
bring attention to practical problems with the state's "end-of-term common law
rule" and to explain that the General Assembly needs to do something.136 1 once
used it on a rule traced only to the time of Henry VIII.1 3 7 Close enough, but
what about a dubious rule laid down only fifty years ago? Past that, quoting
Holmes is almost as risky as quoting the Bible; a diligent adversary can always
come up with an equal and opposite quotation. In this instance, Holmes put
forth more than once his reluctance to overrule precedent with quite articulate
reasons therefor.13 8 The reluctant can always come back with Hamlet's thought
that we should "rather bear those ills we have [t]han fly to others that we know
not of"' 3 9 but that only puts the burden of persuasion on those who would
overrule, which is where it ought to be anyway. And there is a sense in which
Holmes' lines from The Path are too long. In some quarters the quote may be
seen overused, and it may be time for a fresh one, different in tone and texture.
One might turn to Faulkner for an opening shot at fossilized law seen a
source of inconvenience today. Try lawyer Gavin Stevens' oft-quoted
descriptive insight, "The past is never dead. It's not even past."40 No matter
that Faulkner qua Stevens was peaking in a different context. Nor is it fatal that
the line has been used elsewhere, and famously so.141 But does it fit? Does it
add "oomph" and authority for the particularized argument to come, the
argument that a particular rule or doctrine is bad and should be gotten rid of
today? Few arguments fall flatter than those tethered to inapt quotes.14 2 "The
past" is the outdated law, which is "not even past," but do we not have
something of a forced fit after that?143 The Fifth Circuit massaged the words a
bit, finding that "under the Louisiana Law Civil, the past is not dead ... the past
will not die . . . , indeed, the past is not even past."'4 4 The Faulkner/Stevens
quote seems to fit in Judge Carlton Reeves' opinion granting a preliminary
injunction against enforcement of Mississippi laws forbidding same-sex
marriages, where it is followed by "[s]even centuries of strong objections to
136. Moon v. State, 696 S.E.2d 55, 58-59 (Ga. 2010) (Nahmias, J., concurring).
137. Billiot v. State, 478 So. 2d 1043, 1048 n.2 (Miss. 1985).
138. Holmes, "Twenty Years in Retrospect," in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES 151 (Posner ed. 1992).
139. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1, Ins. 81-82.
140. Faulkner, supra note 122, act 1, sc. iii, at page 80.
141. "The Past Isn't Even Dead. It Isn't Even Past" THE ATLANTIC, http://www.theatlantic.com/ daily-
dish/archive/2008/03/-the-past-isnt-dead-it-isnt-even-past/218789/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2016) (speech of then-
Senator/Candidate Barack Obama, Mar. 18, 2008).
142. In Turner v. Irvin, 246 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. App. 1978) (defendant's dog knocked plaintiff from his
motorcycle, causing personal injuries), the Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the defendant,
who had no prior knowledge that the dog had a dangerous propensity. A concurring judge took note of
"widespread interest in the law . . . legally extending and affording the dog's 'first bite' privilege . . . to
humans," and elaborated a bit, then stating, "[t]o this William Faulkner did not agree," quoting Faulkner's
famous line from his Nobel Prize acceptance address, concluding that man "will prevail because he alone
among creatures has a spirit, a soul capable of compassion, sacrifice, love and endurance." The concurring
judge then added, "[s]ince man has a free will he is responsible for his acts." Id. at 128. Using this Faulkner
quote in this context comes across about like making a $100 bet in a penny ante poker game. And that's before
you get to the fact that the "free will" conclusion just doesn't fit.
143. Faulkner, supra note 122, act 1, sc. iii, at page 80.
144. Delaune v. United States, 143 F.3d 995, 998 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoted in Davis v. Davis, 713 S.E.2d
694, 697 n.3 (Ga. App. 2011)).
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homosexual conduct have resulted in a constellation of [s]tate laws that treat gay
and lesbian Mississippians as lesser, 'other' people." 45
After honorable armed service in Iraq, Patrick Lett came home to Alabama
only to become involved in his cousin's cocaine sales operations.146 To escape
that world, Lett re-enlisted in the military and again rendered exemplary service
to his country.147 "Having pulled himself out of the world of illegal drugs and
gone back to serving his country, Lett may have thought that he had left his past
behind him. As Faulkner reminded us, however, 'The past is never dead. It is
not even past'."'48 As fate would have it, one of Lett's pre-re-enlistment sales
had been to an undercover agent working with a task force charged to shut down
Lett's cousin's drug sales operations.149 The Faulkner quote fits in Lett. But not
in our hypothetical case of an ordinary bad rule of law that needs to be set aside.
Try an alternative: "There is no present or future-only the past happening
over and over again-now."150 Eugene O'Neill gives this line to James Tyrone,
Jr., protagonist, in the course of a quasi-biographical depiction of O'Neill's older
brother.15 1  There is no legal context, simply description. A touch of a
normative tone, though O'Neill was not thinking of the law. 152 But it works.
"The past" is the outdated law. 153 "Happening over and over again" is a
sensible precondition to a judicially legislated repealer.154 Should not courts rid
us of bad laws when they can, particularly those being applied "over and over
again," and particularly where their pernicious effects are being felt "now."1 55
Prior to June of 2015, judicial timidity came at the cost of an unjust or unreliable
"present or future," at least in the discrete corner of human activity where the
bad rule had consequences.156 The prospective change carefully made1 57 in
Obergefelll58 works no legally cognizable or otherwise measurable harm to
anyone.
The O'Neill/Jim Tyrone quote also seems to fit the holding that legal bans
on same sex marriage be enjoined, viz., "the past, happening over and over
145. Campaign for Southern Equal. v. Bryant, 2014 WL 6680570, at *24 (S. D. Miss., Nov. 25, 2014).
The discussion above and for the next several pages holds for the purposes presented, notwithstanding the
SCOTUS decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). See also Campaign for Southern Equal. v.
Bryant, 791 F.3d 625 (5th Cir. 2015).
146. United States v. Lett, 483 F.3d 782, 783 (11th Cir. 2007).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 784.
149. Id.
150. EUGENE O'NEILL, A MOON FOR THE MISBEGOTTEN, act 3, in EUGENE O'NEILL, COMPLETE PLAYS,
1932-1943, at 920 (Library of America 1988).
151. Id.
152. O'Neill used the past vis a vis the future elsewhere in his later plays. See, e.g., EUGENE O'NEILL,
LONG DAY'S JOURNEY INTO NIGHT, act 5, in EUGENE O'NEILL, COMPLETE PLAYS, 1932-1943, at 765 (Mary,
O'Neill's mother), and at 812 (Edmund/O'Neill) (Library of America 1988).




157. Obergefell made it clear that "religions, and those who adhere to religious doctrines, may continue
to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be
condoned." Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
158. RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY 391-392 (2016).
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again-now." 59 Again, it doesn't decide the case, but it does set a tone. It
points the reader's thinking in a definite direction.
A verse from W. H. Auden might be considered, when his fictional
philosopher Malin muses:
We would rather be ruined than changed,
We would rather die in our dread
Than climb the cross of the moment
And let our illusions die. 160
Auden is heavy. Malin's "thought" may fit in egregious settings, after
softer approaches have been tried and failed. And where the point on its merits
is one-sided so that the advocate has no reasonable fear of the tables being turned
effectively. The problem with using Auden/Malin in the same-sex marriage
issue is that it works for the true believers on both sides of the question. Use of
Auden/Malin puts one at risk of being "[h]oist with his own petard . . . ."161
A safer, arguably more benign example might be baseball's antitrust
exemption,162 when no other professional sport is so protected and where the
centerpiece of the historical debate-the so-called "reserve clause"163-has been
eviscerated by other forces. But what about the fact that, because the reserve
clause has been overcome by other forces,164 a "fighting faith" that "time has
overcome," no one is likely to be "ruined" if Federal Baseballl65 remains on the
books.
More pressing is the ever-increasing scientific evidence that eye witness
testimony used in criminal prosecutions may not be nearly so worthy of credit as
we have long thought.166 At some point down the line, one might use
Auden/Malin in arguing that the abuse of discretion scope of appellate review of
evidentiary rulings should be abolished.167
A generation ago, there was foment in the law of employment at will.
159. O'NEILL, MISBEGOTTEN, supra note 150 at 920.
160. W. H. Auden, "The Age of Anxiety," Part Six, Epilogue, in W. H. AUDEN, COLLECTED LONGER
POEMS at 350 (1969).
161. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 4, In. 207 ("[h]oist with his own petard").
162. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
163. Traditionally, the "reserve clause" bound a professional baseball player to the team with which he
had a contract on a year to year basis, so that he could not negotiate with another team for a more advantageous
contract than he was being offered by the team with which he had contracted. The only negotiating leverage
available to the player under contract was withholding his services, in which event he would be paid nothing.
The nature, history and effect of the "reserve clause" is explained in Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) and
cases cited in the several opinions of different Justices.
164. See my piece, under the pseudonym of "The Road Lawyer," Of Forests and Trees: Musings on the
Commerce Clause, the Affordable Care Act, and Baseball by the Bay, CAP. AREA B. ASS'N NEWSL. (CABA,
Jackson, Miss.), Aug. 2012, http://www.caba.ms/newsletters/caba-newsletter-august2Ol2.pdf.
165. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat'l League of Prof'1 Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
166. See the many sources I have cited in Robertson, Variations, supra note 39, at 502-06 and 509-15;
see also sources identified in American Law Institute, Principles of the Law: Police Investigations § 9.03,
Reporters' Note, 67-69, in Preliminary Draft No. 1 (Mar. 2, 2016). While Preliminary Draft No. 1 is just that,
and is not the official position of the ALI, the sources identified in the Reporters' Note are representative of
recent thinking on this subject.
167. Robertson, Variations, supra note 39, at 552-564.
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Several times, the court on which I sat trotted out the line from French poet,
journalist, novelist, and Nobel Prize laureate, Anatole France, viz., "'[T]he law,
in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under
bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread'."1 68 In another case, I took note
that however clever the quote, there were voices of caution in other quarters.169
In time, two exceptions have been recognized to Mississippi's default rule of
employment at will, 170 but it has otherwise weathered the storm of Anatole
France's facially persuasive insight, and in no less than forty-nine states.17 1 An
otherwise apt voice from the world of literature might lead to an inquiry, but we
should be open to empirical analysis of consequences suggesting a quite
different view.
F. Literary Sources with Clout
Before many audiences, a biblical saying written in Elizabethan English is
hard to beat. Never mind that some other prophet has argued the opposite, as is
so often the case. My favorite (arguably more appropriate in a political context)
has always been, "and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their
spears into pruning hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither
shall they learn war any more . " found in Isaiah 2:4 and in Micah 4:3,
juxtaposed against the Book of Joel, viz., "Beat your plowshares into swords,
and your pruninghooks into spears: let the weak say, I am strong." Joel 3:10.172
This reminds me of cases I've had decided on two-to-one panel votes.17 3 More
secularly minded lawyers twit their Christian friends with Matthew 5:21-48,
arguably the greatest repealer clause of all time (within Christendom, at least),
yet ignored a dozen times a day when some Old Testament injunction suits the
author's convenience or disposition.174
In 1912, the Supreme Court of Mississippi was challenged to measure the
constitutionality of a statute making it illegal for an employer engaged
manufacturing or repairing to work its employees more than ten hours a day.175
Lochner had been handed down a few years earlier.176 Justice Richard F. Reed
summoned a range of rhetorical strategies, upholding the statute.177 He turned to
history to show that "[1]aws regulating the time when men shall labor are not
168. Bobbitt v. The Orchard, Ltd., 603 So. 2d 356, 361 (Miss. 1992) (quoting Shaw v. Burchfield, 481
So. 2d 247, 254 (Miss. 1985), in turn quoting ANATOLE FRANCE, LE LYS ROUGE (1894), reproduced in 5
WORKS OF ANATOLE FRANCE 91 (W. Stephens transl. 1924)).
169. See Perry v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 508 So. 2d 1086, 1090-91 (Miss. 1987) (Robertson, J.,
concurring).
170. Jim Waide & Rachel Waide, Exceptions to the Mississippi Employment at Will Doctrine Remain
Viable, THE Mississippi LAWYER 16-20 (Winter 2015).
171. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, § 2.01, cmt. b., Appendix A to Reporters' Notes
(2015).
172. Isaiah 2:4, Micah 4:3, Joel 3:10 (King James).
173. Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1973); and Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed.
Cir. 2006).
174. Matthew 5:21-48 (King James).
175. State v. J.J. Newman Lumber Co., 59 So. 923 (1912) (suggestion of error overruled by State v. J.J.
Newman Lunber Co. 60 So. 215 (1913)).
176. Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S 45, 45 (1905).
177. Newman Lumber Co., 59 So. at 929.
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new."1 78 Precedent after precedent was cited.179 Reed saved his trump card for
last, "the statutes governing Jehovah's ancient people, Israel." 180
And notice the provision in Exodus 23:12, limiting the time in which the
laborer shall work: "Six days thou shalt do thy work, and on the seventh day
thou shalt rest; that thine ox and thine ass may have rest, and the son of thy
handmaid and the so-journer, may be refreshed."18 1
A generation ago, a school board was a bit heavy-handed in punishing two
eleventh grade cheerleaders for their never fully explained but arguably
sophomoric exuberance in painting part of a cheer on the school wall.182 The
parents of the girls were outraged and sued.183 For all of the obvious reasons,
the court was reluctant to legally second-guess the local school board's
actions.184  Suggestions of alternative lesser punishments were proffered,
including that the girls be required to memorize Portia's famous words and then
take on the challenging task of teaching their moral to the school board,18 5
Or perhaps special "extra" learning tasks might be assigned,
such as reading and memorizing selections by Shakespeare. The
Merchant of Venice would not be inappropriate, where these two
girls could learn from Portia that "the quality of mercy is not
strain'd" and that "earthly power doth ... show likest to God's
when mercy seasons justice," Act IV, Sc. 1, lines 184, 196-97-
and teach this to their principal, their superintendent, their
school board, and their community.186
Shakespeare has long been a favorite in Georgia. I noted Boston Mercantile
above and Justice John S. Candler's use of the Bard's words of wisdom imparted
through Portia and Shylock.187 A century ago, it was not unheard of that a
literate lawyer used verse in his argument. More than this, and Judge Arthur G.
Powell's response, are found in a 1907 case:18 8
The argument of the plaintiff in error is unique, being presented
in verse. However, when we compare the poetic argument with
the record, we find that Shakespeare was correct in saying: "The
poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling, doth glance from heaven to
earth, from earth to heaven, and, as an imagination bodies forth





182. Clinton Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Byrd, 477 So. 2d 237, 238 (Miss. 1985).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 242 (high school discipline; Portia "quality of mercy" in Merchant of Venice).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Bos. Mercantile Co. v. Ouldcarter Co., 51 S.E. 466, 468 (1905).
188. Logan v. Irvin, 57 S.E. 934 (Ga. App. 1907).
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shapes, and gives to airy nothing a local habitation and a name,"
and that Pope is not to be trusted in saying that "Truth shines the
brighter clad in verse." The "thoughts that breathe and words
that burn" must not be allowed to override the merciless logic of
the law, which dictates that appellate courts must not disturb a
verdict supported by the evidence and approved by the trial
judge.189
Pyle v. State1 9 0 is a manslaughter case, which turned on a so-called dying
declaration of the victim. In discussing the problem with such statements heard
by a jury, Chief Judge Benjamin H. Hill added:
In the language of Sir Walter Raleigh: "A dying man is ever
presumed to speak the truth." And in the words of that mighty
master of the human heart, Shakespeare (Richard II, act 2, scene
1), "The tongues of dying men enforce attention like deep
harmony."'91
This line is a nice tone-setter, but what if the context is a challenge that the
dying declaration rulel92 is without grounding in empirical evidence,193 and
leads to unreliable adjudications? Shakespeare and Sir Walter Raleigh pitted
against O'Neill, or is it Holmes or Faulkner or Auden?
An obscure quote from Hamlet made its way into another case by Judge
Powell, this one involving a prosecution for the illegal sale of intoxicating
liquor.194 A threshold question was the definition of "intoxicating liquor."' 95
With regard to a quotation from the Century Dictionary, Judge Powell added
further on this definition the grave digger's line from Shakespeare's Hamlet,
"Fetch me a stoup of liquor."' 96 So?197
I noted above the early workers' compensation scope-of-employment case
189. Id. at 934.
190. Pyle v. State, 62 S.E. 540 (Ga. App. 1908).
191. Id. at 542.
192. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); O.C.G.A. § 24-8-804(b)(2); MISS. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). The challenge,
of course, would have to be made before that entity which has the authority to alter or amend the rule, and
through the appropriate rule-making processes. In my state the Supreme Court of Mississippi claims the
authority to change rules of evidence on the fly without resort to the Rules Advisory Committee. See, e.g.,
Hudspeth v. State Highway Comm'n of Mississippi., 534 So. 2d 210, 213 (Miss. 1988).
193. Cf Robertson, Variations, upra note 39, at 509-16. This is not the occasion to get into the serious
questions being raised in various quarters regarding the reliability of trial evidence premises long taken for
granted. See also Judge Posner's concurring opinion in United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 799 (7th Cir.
2014) (Posner, J., concurring) (questioning reliability of present sense impressions and excited utterances under
FED. R. EVID. 803(1), (2)); see also O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803(1), (2) and MIss. R. EVID. 803(1), (2), only to show
that the rumblings are enough that this is a credible context for considering eligible literary allusions, pro and
con, and, of course, whether literary allusions have any function other than affording the spokesman a chance
to show how well read he may be, and risk being hoist if he has invoked a less than apt allusion.
194. Carswell v. State, 66 S.E. 488, 488 (Ga. App. 1909).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 488 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 5, sc. 1, In. 68).
197. Likely I would have used it in City of Clinton, 493 So. 2d 331, see below, if I had properly brushed
up on my Shakespeare before authoring that one.
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arose from the act of a watchman who drowned while attempting to rescue a dog
which had jumped or fallen into a river.198 Justice Price Gilbert waxed poetic
and added his finding that "[firom the dawn of primal history the dog has
loomed large in the art and literature of the world, including judicial
literature."1 99  Among many literary worthies, Gilbert cited and quoted
Shakespeare at length, viz., King John, Julius Caesar, Macbeth, Midsummer
Night's Dream.200 His opinion in Montgomery is presented in full, above.201
State Highway Board of Georgia v. Shierling arose from the condemnation
of landowner's property to build a public roadway.202 One issue was whether
the availability of the land for furnishing dirt to fill in the roadway should be
admitted on the question of fair market value.203 The Court of Appeals held that
it was, provoking a passionate dissent, inter alia, "[m]ust the Highway Board, in
effect, pay again and at soaring artificial prices for the dirt from the land which
they condemn? If so, like Shakespeare's jealousy, 'which makes its own food on
which it feeds,' there is no end to the vicious cycle."204
Felker v. Johnson takes us back to Hamlet, and to a passage as well-known
as is obscure the "stoup of liquor" quote Judge Powell used in Carswell:
It might be well to remark that this case is one well illustrative
of the "law's delay" spoken of by Shakespeare, for the
melancholy Dane in his famous soliloquy asks: "For who would
bear the whips and scorns of time, the oppressor's wrong, the
proud man's contumely, the pangs of despised love, the law's
delay, etc."205
A moment here. In 1603, Shakespeare speaks through Hamlet and lists "the
law's delay" as one of seven trials of living so hard to bear that they might weigh
in favor of suicide.206 And so we have constitutional guarantees of a speedy
trial,207 augmented by statuteS208 and rules. Rules governing civil litigations are
to be construed and applied so as "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding."209 In 1853, it took Charles
Dickens more than 500 pages to say what Shakespeare said n three words-and
the Sixth Amendment in only a few more. But, then, Jandyce and Jandyce was
a civil case.
198. Montgomery v. Maryland Casualty Co., 151 S.E. 363 (Ga. 1930).
199. Id. at 364.
200. Id. at 364-65.
201. See supra notes 12-39 and accompanying text.
202. 181 S.E. 885 (Ga. App. 1935).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 889 (Jenkins, P. J., dissenting).
205. Felker v. Johnson, 186 S.E. 144, 145 (Ga. App. 1936). See supra note 84.
206. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1, In. 72.
207. U.S. CONST. amend. vi; MIss. CONST., art 3, § 26.
208. See Federal Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161-3174 (2008); see also similar state statutes and
rules, e.g., D. Ak. Ct. R. 2.04 (1999); E. D. Ark. Speedy Trial Act Plan (2008); D. Ariz. Ct. R. LRCrim 12.2
(2011); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-17-1 (Rev. 2007) (270 day rule).
209. FED. R. CIV. P. 1; MISS. R. CIV. P. 1.
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More recently, a plaintiff was allowed to stack uninsured motorist
coverages but not to recover more than his actual damages.2 10 Plaintiffs
recovery of attorneys' fees and a bad faith penalty were denied.2 11 Concerning
the uninsured motorist statute, a concurring judge observed,
It is true that occasionally a verdict for bad faith is affirmed, but
it is so rare as to be almost like Shakespeare's dissertation on the
fishnet:
Help master, help! Here's fish hangs in the net like a
poor man's right in the law; 'twill hardly come out.'
(Pericles,
Prince of Tyre 11: 1)212
Associates Financial Services Company v. Johnson held it impermissible
for a deputy sheriff to bid on and purchase property sold at judicial foreclosure
conducted by his office.2 13 The Georgia Court of Appeals reasoned:
Nor can a 'sham' sale to a third party be upheld, it appearing
that in fact the third party bid off the property and bought it for
the sheriff or his deputy. What the sheriff or his deputy may not
do directly they can not indirectly do, for 'indirection thereby
grows direct.' 2 14
In Collett v. State,2 15 Judge Randall Evans, Jr. practiced Polonius' teaching
that "brevity is the soul of wit," 2 16 saying, "[w]hen the case first came to this
court, I wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion, . . . , but with no success whatsoever.
But, as Shakespeare says, 'All's well that ends well'." 2 17
Georgia Court of Appeals Judge Braswell Deen began, "'What's in a
name?' inquired Shakespeare's most celebrated heroine [Juliet], and appellant
Napoleon Elijah Pope may well be asking the same question," noting that Pope
had "four felony convictions already to his credit . .. [and that he was] bearer of
names rich in connotations of temporal and spiritual power and glory . "218
Several years later, Judge Deen wrote that there is "a sizable quantum of
evidence that tended to impeach appellant's disclaimers of having made or
placed the signs, and otherwise to implicate him to such an extent as to permit a
rational trier of fact to (as Shakespeare's Polonius expressed it) 'by indirections
210. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Harper, 188 S.E.2d 813, 817 (Ga. App. 1972).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 819 (Evans, J., concurring) (citing WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, PERICLES, PRINCE OF TYRE, act 2,
sc. 1, Ins. 122-124).
213. Ass'ns Fin. Serv.s Co. v. Johnson, 197 S.E.2d 764, 766 (Ga. App. 1973).
214. Id. at 766 n.1 (citing WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING JOHN, act 3, sc. 1, In. 276).
215. 211 S.E.2d 198 (Ga. App. 1974).
216. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 2, sc. 2, In. 90.
217. Collett, 211 S.E.2d at 198. Of course, ALL'S WELL THAT ENDS WELL is the name of the play, not a
line in it, but see WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ALL'S WELL THAT ENDS WELL, Epilogue, Ins. 335-36.
218. Pope v. State, 342 S.E.2d 330, 331 (Ga. App. 1986).
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find directions out"' 2
19
Matthews v. Douberly concerns a thorny question of statutory construction
and finds the Georgia Appeals Court invoking a Shakespearean line that has
passed into common usage, "This case puts the spotlight on this legislative
shortcoming and brings Shakespeare['s Polonius] to mind: 'Though this be
madness, yet there is method in 't." 220 This line has been so familiar for so long
that a century ago it was quoted without attribution.221 Or just paraphrased, "If
Skow were suffering from a madness, it was a madness with a method."222
Hamlet offers another phrase that has enriched the prose of many an
adjudication. Hamlet perceived the King's purpose in having Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern accompany him to England, and tells the Queen he will have the
King "[h]oist with his own petard."223 Some cite this one with attribution,224
but others do not see the need; the usage is so common.225
More so with the last two words of a line from Marc Antony's reply to
Brutus at the funeral of Julius Caesar, "When that the poor have cried. Caesar
hath wept; Ambition shall be made of sterner stuff." 2 26 An occasional opinion
will provide a full quotation with a citation to Shakespeare's play.227 Over a
hundred opinions are easily found declaring this litigational phenomenon or that
in need of "sterner stuff," without quotation marks or attribution.228
219. Snipes v. Mack, 381 S.E.2d 318, 319 (Ga. App. 1989) (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET
act 2, sc. 1, In. 66. Compare the quote from KING JOHN used in Associates Financial discussed above).
220. 428 S.E.2d 588, 589 (Ga. App. 1993) (citing WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2, In. 207-
08).
221. Georgia R.R. v. Hunter, 71 S.E. 681, 681 (Ga. App. 1911).
222. United States v. Skow, 62 F.App'x. 660, 662 (7th Cir. 2003); see, e.g., Nace v. Boyer, 30 Pa. 99,
103 (Pa. 1858); Brandon v. Slade, 47 So. 694, 698 (La. 1908); State v. Sharp, 135 S.W. 488, 496 (Mo. 1911);
Universal Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bassett, 200 N.E. 843, 845 (Ohio 1936); People v. Bassett, 443 P.2d 777, 782
(Cal. 1968); Simon v. Smith, 470 So. 2d 941, 945 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
223. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 4, In. 207. ("hoist with his own petard").
224. Whitehead v. Food Max of Mississippi, Inc., 332 F.3d 796, 807 (5th Cir. 2003); Keane v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d 921, 932 (S.D.Tex. 2004); Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts v. Mirage
Resorts, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 395, 404 n.7 (D. N. J. 1997); Gathings v. Robertson Brokerage Co., 367 S.E.2d 423,
427 n.3 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988); Frosburg v. State Dept. of Pers., 375 A.2d 582, 588 n.8 (Ct. Spec. App. Md.
1977).
225. Allen v. Texas Dept. of Human Services, 114 F.3d 1182, *3 (5th Cir. 1997); Immuno International
A. G. v. Hillsborough County, Florida, 775 F.2d 1430, 1432 (11th Cir. 1985); Noxubee Cnty. Democratic
Exec. Comm. v. Russell, 443 So. 2d 1191, 1196 (Miss. 1983); Bunch v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d 249, 250 (4th Cir.
1982); State v. Janvrin, 441 A.2d 1144, 1145 (N.H. 1982); Altergott v. Yeager, 543 P.2d 1293, 1298 (Colo.
App. 1975); U. S. v. Alexander, 495 F.2d 552, 553 (2d Cir. 1974); Bacher v. Higgins, 157 So. 800, 801 (La. Ct.
App. 1934).
226. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 2, Ins. 96-97.
227. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Lawyers Mutual Ins. Co. of Kentucky, 2011 WL 1598743, *5 (Ky. Ct. App.
2011) (Lambert, J., dissenting).
228. See, e.g., Newell v. State, No. 2013-KA-00030-COA, 2014 WL 4695871, *2 (Miss. Ct. App. Sept.
23, 2014) ("expert testimony should be made of sterner stuff"); Gootee v. State, 588 N.E.2d 584, 588 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1992) ("proof beyond a reasonable doubt should be made of sterner stuff than this"); Lowman v.
Piedmont Exec. Shirt Mfg. Co., 547 So. 2d 90, 96 (Ala. 1989) ("Stare decisis should be made of sterner stuff
than the mere fabric of this year's fashion."); Fulton v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 498 So. 2d 1215 (Miss.
1986) (Robertson, J., in a prior life) ("Claims of defamation must rest upon sterner stuff than the innuendo,
speculation and conjecture the Fultons present to us this day.").
PRA TICAL BENEFITS OF LITERATURE IN LAW
G. A Quotation Lawyers Should Resist and Leave to the Judges
The law is not universally loved. Judges do things that are terribly
unpopular, and sometimes with regret. In a Minnesota case, the court held:
These individual appellants are unable to recover the unjustly
levied tax. Citizens are forced to bear the consequences of
municipal iniquity and the possibility of local larceny. It is with
regret that we find ourselves forced to conclude that the law here
allows no recovery for appellants. We have some understanding
of Flannery O'Connor's Mr. Shiflet who said,
'It didn't satisfy me at all.'
'It satisfied the law,' the old woman said sharply.
'The law,' Mr. Shiflet said and spit, "It's the law that
don't satisfy me." 229
In THE ADVENTURES OF OLIVER TWIST, Charles Dickens created a scene
that attracts overly eager lawyers like the moth to the flame. First, the story:
'It was all Mrs. Bumble. She would do it,' urged Mr. Bumble;
first looking round to ascertain that his partner had left the room.
'That is no excuse,' replied Mr. Brownlow. 'You were present
on the occasion of the destruction of these trinkets, and, indeed,
are the more guilty of the two, in the eye of the law, for the law
supposes that your wife acts under your direction.'
'If the law supposes that,' replied Mr. Bumble, squeezing his
had emphatically in both hands, 'the law is a ass a idiot. If that's
the eye of the law, the law's a bachelor, and the worst I wish the
law is, that his eye may be opened by experience.'230
At times, judges use the Mr. Bumble quote with effect. Judge Robert H.
Jordan of the Court of Appeals of Georgia faced an argument that counsel had no
duty to notify his adversary that there was a defect in a notice of deposition. The
argument:
would allow counsel so inclined to 'sit back', allow the opposite
party to proceed at considerable expense with the deposition
only to have it thrown out on some defect in the notice. If the
law is reduced to this, as Mr. Bumble said in Oliver Twist, "the
229. Country Joe, Inc. v. City of Eagan, No. C4-98-618, 1998 WL 713481, *3 (Minn. App. Oct, 13,
1998), quoting FLANNERY O'CONNOR, "The Life You Save May Be Your Own," in COMPLETE STORIES 145,
153 (1971).
230. The SCOTUS quoted this entire passage in Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 212 fn. 10 (1977).
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law is an ass, a idiot." 231
U.S. Circuit Judge Harold DeMoss was on the mark with Mr. Bumble in a
one-paragraph concurring opinion in 1993:
I concur in the reasoning and result of Judge King's well-crafted
opinion. We have simply said that the law is what Congress ays
is the law. However, on rare occasions, in the words of Mr.
Bumble in Charles Dickens' Oliver Twist, ". . . the law is a[n]
ass," and this is one of those occasions. To say that a person is
"responsibly connected" to an action of a corporation simply by
reason of being a minority shareholder of that corporation, flies
in the face of both logic and reality." 232
Lawyers should take note of the experience of trial judges or hearing
officers who invoke Mr. Bumble's truism. In 2004, the South Carolina Court of
Appeals handed the trial judge his teeth, but with a soft touch, quite adequate
given Mr. Bumble's stature in the public eye:
Upon finding that the granting clause of the 1937 deed
constitutes a definite grant in fee simple, this court must hold
that the purpose clause following the property description is
ineffectual. The SCFC, therefore, owns the ten-acre parcel in
fee simple absolute, notwithstanding any comments Mr. Bumble
may care to make on the matter.233
In 1972, a U.S. Circuit Judge nicely turned the tables on an NLRB trial
examiner. Without the preliminaries about the union campaign button at issue,
we find:
The Trial Examiner opined below, "When general principles of
labor law are determined by the eighth or the quarter of an inch
as measured by rule or caliper, then it is time for 'Bumble' to
turn over in his grave and repeat his famous observation, the
'law is a Ass."' We think, however, that it would be equally
asinine, under the circumstances of this case, to ignore the size
of the button and its capacity for being noticed.234
A year earlier, another Fifth Circuit Judge showed what a stuffed shirt those
in his position can be:
231. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas v. Hodgson, 183 S.E.2d 4, 6 (Ga. App. 1971).
232. Hawkins v. Agric. Mktg. Serv., USDA, 10 F.3d 1125, 1135 (5th Cir. 1993) (DeMoss, J., specially
concurring).
233. Hunt v. South Carolina Forestry Comm'n, 595 S.E. 2d 846, 850 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004) (citing the
trial judge's use of Mr. Bumble's exclamation).
234. Davidson-Paxton Co. v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 364, 368 (5th Cir. 1972).
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Lord Coke is quoted as saying that reason is the life of the law.
Charles Dickens, in Oliver Twist, had one of his characters say
that the law is an ass. It may be that there are those in this day
and time who would think it absurd for an appellate court to
hold a trial court in error for failing to charge the jury that it
might find a defendant not guilty of an offense which he did not
deny having committed. Yet such is the law and reason is the
life of the law.235
More recently, the Supreme Court of Mississippi said, "Charles Dickens
wrote, 'the law is an ass.' It has been the experience of this writer that the law is
never an 'ass'; however, it is made to sometimes appear that way by judges or
courts."23 6
Lawyers would be wise to leave this one to the judges, however apt Mr.
Bumble's sage insight may be.
H. Rhetorical Fictional Flourishes as Sources ofLegislative Facts
In certain circumstances the rules of evidence allow that the credibility of a
witness may be impeached by showing that he had suffered a prior felony
conviction. The probative force of a witness's prior arson conviction was a
central issue in McInnis v. State.2 3 7  The court noted experience and
understanding of a number of known categories of prior conviction formally at
issue and then turned to William Faulkner's short story, "Barn Burning," to
show added complexity in the act of arson:
More complex and profound is the character of Faulkner's
quasi-fictional barn burner, Ab Snopes who practiced "shabby
and ceremonial violence"FN6 half explained by
FN6. Faulkner, "Barn Burning", Collected Stories 20
(1977). See also Faulkner, The Hamlet 9-18 (1940).
this old habit, the old blood ... which had run for so long (and
who knew where, battening on what of outrage and savagery
and lust) . .FN7
FN7- "Barn Burning", at 21.
Yet this is the same Ab Snopes of whom it was said
that the element of fire spoke to some deep mainspring
of his . . . being, as the element of steel or of powder
spoke to other men, as the one weapon for the
235. United States v. Skinner, 437 F.2d 164, 166 (5th Cir. 1971).
236. Frank v. Dore, 635 So. 2d 1369, 1374 (Miss. 1994).
237. 527 So. 2d 84 (Miss. 1988).
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preservation of integrity, else breath were not worth the
breathing, and hence to be regarded with respect and
used with discretion.FN8
FN8. "Barn Burning", at 7-8.
Suffice it to say that little in the pyromania profile would shed
any light on whether that individual was likely to be a truthful
witness. And who knows if our general revulsion at Ab Snopes'
old blood generates the specific conclusion that he will likely
lie.23 8
Does Faulkner inform the judicial understanding of how it should approach
and apply MISS. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)? To some extent. Does it decide the issue in
the particular case? Of course not. But is it not a plus that the court be a bit
more cautious in this important evidentiary ruling than it might otherwise have
been? And does not McInnis send a message to the future, the hardened
traditional view of the supposed impeachment value of a criminal conviction
notwithstanding? As sure as the Sun rises in the East, the time will come when
the law backs away from evidentiary truisms that cannot be validated by reliable
empirical investigation. "Time has upset many fighting faiths," 239 and will
again.
IV. A MORE EXTENSIVE USE OF THE HUMANITIES IN ADJUDICATION
I have presented a sampling of judicial resorts to literature that may be
found in reported decisions. There are no doubt hundreds more of these and
similar usages. The practice is familiar enough. There are books of quotations
for lawyers and judges, and the Internet provides unlimited sources. Equally
available are lists of fictional characters extending well beyond Sherlock Holmes
and Shylock and even Mr. Bumble. To my mind, this need not be the limit.
Every now and then a case comes along that calls for more, for a deeper scouring
of the humanities and of literature in particular. One is the Montgomery case set
out above. I present three more of these below. Judgments regarding the
success of the stratagem, and its execution in particular instances, are for others,
certainly so on the last three where yours truly played a part. The merit of its use
is a function of the sense of humanity the law ought always demand of those
who practice it, from whichever side of the bar.
A. An Unexpected Find for Communicating with the Public and with the Future
In the mid-1980s, I was unaware of Justice Gilbert's efforts in Montgomery.
But I had another penchant that served me at the time, albeit minimally.
Baseball has long been my not altogether secular eligion. I have known of
Flood v. Kuhn24 0 from the day it was handed down in 1972. I have always been
238. Id. at 89.
239. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
240. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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annoyed by Justice Blackmon's purported paean to baseball.24 1 Not that it was
inappropriate or out of place; not at all. It is sophomoric. It could have been
done better,242 and maybe brought a touch of credibility to a decision otherwise
difficult to defend.243
In the Fall of 1984, I was well into my second year of service on the
Supreme Court of Mississippi. I had drawn the appeal of a man who had been
convicted of headlighting deer and other game offenses.244 Milton Pharr and
three companions had come down from the Northeast Mississippi hill country.
The charges against them arose from an out-of-season, dark-of-night poaching
venture in the woods of rural Leflore County over in the Delta toward The River.
At some point after I drew the Pharr case, my generation-older colleague,
Justice Roy Noble Lee, an avid outdoorsman, visited my office.2 45 Roy was the
senior and thus presiding member of the three-judge panel that would hear the
appeal.
At the time, Roy and I had not developed much of a personal relationship,
though a few months earlier he had provided me cover with a concurring opinion
in a hot button capital murder case.2 46 I was aware of his presence. Justice
Lee's father had served on the Court, and briefly as Chief Justice at the end of
his tenure. The Court had a rather unusual annual schedule of court sittings that
was explained in substantial part by Roy's insistence that conflicts with hunting
seasons be avoided.
At some point, Roy showed up at my office, unannounced, and in his soft,
understated way, said, "Jimmy, I see you've got that deer headlighting case. I
know you'll do a good job with it."247 I was surprised-not sure I knew at the
241. Id. at 260-64. I was also aware of Schlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ill. App. 1968)
(holding that under the business judgment rule the management of the Chicago Cubs could persist in day games
only, over the objection of minority shareholders who saw greater profits in night baseball).
242. See CAP. AREA B. ASS'N NEWSL. www.caba.ms/Archives/RoadLawyer for my many musings about
baseball and law over the past fifteen years or so, using the pseudonym of "The Road Lawyer." Prior to 2011,
these were published in hard copy form in Hinds County Bar Association Newsletter, copies of which are also
available at Archives.
243. I was not above citing Justice Blackmon's strategic ploy (but not the quality of its execution) in
three cases discussed below, to the end that a SCOTUS use of the approach might give some traditionalist
jurisprudes a precedent for accepting my use of literature and history in cases where it was otherwise
appropriate. See Robertson, Variations, supra note 39 at 600 fn. 540. What I did in these three cases was
beyond the experience of well-meaning colleagues and lots of lawyers.
244. MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-7-95 (1972).
245. The Court had a pre-hearing assignment system. I was responsible for a complete work-up-with
the assistance of law clerks, studying the appellate record, reading the briefs, doing any needed supplemental or
updating research, and generating a memorandum concisely summarizing what the appeal was all about, with a
suggested outcome. Ordinarily, this would be before any other Justice knew about the case. This memo would
go to a pre-assigned three-Justice panel, of which I would be one member. The appeal would be argued (in
those days oral argument was available as a matter of right) and conferenced. If a majority of the nine Justices
agreed with my recommendation, I would author the opinion of the Court.
246. See Moffett v. State, 456 So. 2d 714, 723-24 (Miss. 1984). I have told this story in a reminiscence
piece following Justice Lee's death. See James L. Robertson, Remembering Judge Roy Noble Lee, October 19,
1915 - January 21, 2015, CABA NEWSLETTER, (Apr. 2015), http://caba.ms/newsletters/caba-april-2015.pdf
(last visited Mar. 25, 2015).
247. This story has been told by others: Chris Shaw, The Storied Career of former Chief Justice Roy
Noble Lee, CABA NEWSLETTER, (Jan. 2013), http://caba.ms/newsletters/caba-newsletter-jan2013.pdf (last
visited Mar. 25, 2015).
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time that I had a deer headlighting case on my list. Oral argument was several
months away. Justice Lee was a close-to-the-vest guy, a former FBI agent, a
long time district attorney. I had understood that Roy did not think judges
should politic cases (unlike some of the others). This may have been only the
second time he had visited my suite in the twenty-odd months we had served
together.248
A week or so later, Roy came by again. "Jimmy, this deer headlighting
case really is important," and maybe a few carefully chosen but brief follow up
words.
Understand that I have never been hunting in my life. My father saw to it
that Santa Claus brought me a .410 gauge shotgun for Christmas 1952, after my
twelfth birthday. That afternoon, we went to a family cabin on Lake Ferguson,
an oxbow lake about eight miles north of Greenville, Mississippi, where we
lived. With my father's guidance, I fired at tin cans for a while. No critters
around. It was too cold for snakes. My Christmas gift was left at the lake house.
At some point in February, someone broke into the Cabin and helped himself to
a number of items, including my once-fired .410 shotgun, ending my career as a
would-be hunter. Thirty-two years or so later, I was serving on my state's
highest court, being told by a senior Justice of the importance of a deer
headlighting prosecution, the appeal of which I had been assigned.
Justice Lee made several more visits, chatting at some point about the
practical problems of game law enforcement: lack of staff, low pay, and how
game wardens had a much tougher job than most law enforcement officers
because of the physical and cultural environment in which offenders broke the
law. I began to wonder if it was all because Roy knew I was not a hunter and
was afraid I was out of my element with a case like this. Justice Lee hardly hid
his view that poachers were the scum of the earth and needed to be put under the
jail; those headlighting deer were worse. He never said, "You need to affirm this
conviction."
About a week before the oral argument, Justice Lee came by again.
"Jimmy, if you can, I hope you'll handle this case so that it can get some
publicity." Without being pre-committed to any particular outcome, I sensed I
should try to accommodate my colleague. But how? Pharr v. State was not the
first case I'd been assigned that arose from an activity I knew next to nothing
about.
Fast forward to the en banc conference after oral argument. The court was
split over whether Milton Pharr was guilty of one or multiple offenses. Was
headlighting and killing two deer with continued headlighting thereafter three
offenses, or was headlighting a single offense? We could discuss and disagree
amicably on that. Any conviction affirmed would have satisfied the state
gaming authorities, or so I sensed.
In 1984, I lived in Oxford, Mississippi, home of the late William Faulkner.
I had read a fair sampling of Faulkner's works. Hunting was a big part of life in
Yoknapatawpha County and its environs. I was aware of the penchants and
248. See supra note 227, re: the Moffett case for Justice Lee's first visit to my office.
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foibles of that famous fictional family of Snopeses. If a man would bum a
barn,249 he wouldn't bat an eye at poaching and headlighting a deer. Maybe
Faulkner was the vehicle I might use to make Pharr seem a little less pedestrian.
I could think of no other way to accommodate my elder colleague, and so I
crafted an opinion consistent with the en banc majority's vote. Being of the
view that an appellate opinion should be, in substantial part, a narrative, a story
worth telling, I tried to set the story of Milton Pharr and his fellow poachers in
Faulkner's world, particularly the part that formed the setting for Go DOWN,
MOSES. That world included the social milieu that enhanced understanding of
the matter at hand.
I set the tone with this opening paragraph:
Headlighting deer is a sorry form of human behavior made
unlawful by the wildlife conservation laws of this state. The
deer, usually a doe, hit with the blinding light stands stupified
and is slaughtered. In addition to his unsportsmanlike conduct,
the poacher operates at night and endangers others each time he
fires. He is of Snopesean genre.250
After telling the story of what happened in the early morning hours of
February 21, 1982, and setting out the procedural history of the case, I provided
the broader context, the legislative facts, if you will, the cultural context in aid of
understanding, including thoughts from earlier cases:
Our law is the witness and external deposit of the values and
culture of our society.FN4 Hunting and the outdoors have
supplied much of that culture. They have informed our values
and generated an ethical code of their own, much of which has
been enacted within the wildlife conservation laws of this state.
FN4. Cf Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV.L.REv. 457, 459
(1897). (The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral
life. Its history is the history of the moral development of the
race.)
Our Presiding Justice Roy Noble Lee understands these truths.
In Strong v. Bostick, 420 So.2d 1356, 1364 (Miss.1982), he
included himself among the many men who feel that a person
who has never seen squirrels jump from limb to limb in the deep
swamp on a frosty Fall morning; or has never heard a wild
turkey gobble in April or seen him strut during mating season;
or has never watched a deer bound through the woods and fields,
or heard a pack of hounds run a fox, or tree a coon (raccoon); or
249. WILLIAM FAULKNER, Barn Burning, COLLECTED STORIES 20 (1977); WILIAM FAULKNER, THE
HAMLET 9-18 (1940).
250. Pharr v. State, 465 So. 2d 294, 296 (Miss. 1984).
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has never hunted the rabbit, or flushed a covey of quail ahead of
a pointed bird dog; or has never angled for bass or caught bream
on a light line and rod, or taken catfish from a trotline and limb
hook; has never lived.
420 So.2d at 1364 [Emphasis added]
Moreover, Justice Lee has reminded us that
Present generations owe posterity the obligation to protect and
conserve wildlife, a valuable and essential natural resource, in
order that future generations may have game and fish for their
enjoyment, pleasure and benefit. 420 So.2d at 1364.251
It did not take an experienced hunter to know Roy's truth. I recalled a not
dissimilar truth, uttered by one of our most literate Americans of a generation
before my time. In the dark days of May of 1944, Judge Learned Hand
challenged his countrymen to understand that:
"[1]iberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies
there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no
constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it. While
it lies there it needs no constitution, no law, no court to save
it."252
Love of nature and the will to conserve natural resources including ferrae
naturae similarly lies in the hearts of men and women. How sad it was that
people of limited understanding and vision felt they needed to preserve
constitutionally "the right to hunt, fish and harvest wildlife." 253 Understanding
Faulkner and the humanity of Learned Hand's wise insight would and always
will be far more effective than any constitutional amendment, legislative law or
court case could ever be.
But back to Pharr v. State. With a sense of the limits of the law, and the
power of Faulkner's prose, I wrote for the court2 54 that:
In fulfillment of that obligation, our legislature has made the sort
of conduct with which we are here concerned unlawful. Yet,
more than the public policy of wild game conservation is served
by this legislation. We here enforce the positive law's
embodiment of the ethics of the hunt.
With insight and sensitivity, our most literate hunter, speaking
251. Id. at 297-98.
252. LEARNED HAND, The Spirit of Liberty in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
LEARNED HAND 190 (Irving Dilliard 3rd ed. 1974).
253. MISS. CONST. art. III, § 12-A, H. Con. R. 30 (ratified Nov. 4, 2014).
254. Pharr, 465 So.2d at 298.
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of his short story, "'The Bear,' has said pursuit is the essence of
the hunt, but
"not only to pursue but to overtake and then have the
compassion not to destroy, to catch, to touch, and then
let go because then tomorrow you can pursue again. If
you destroy it, what you caught, then it's gone, it's
finished. And that to me is sometimes the greater part of
valor. . ., not to destroy what you have pursued. The
pursuit's the thing, not the reward, not the gain. FN5
FN5. F. Gwynn & J. Glotner, eds., Faulkner in the
University 271-272 (1959).
The thrill of the chase, the fair and honorable pursuit and not the kill
undergird the ethics of the hunter.
This case concerned the slaughter of doe at night. As we review today's
facts, we recall that old Ike McCaslin en route to deer camp in the Delta once
said
"The only fighting anywhere that ever had anything of God's
blessing on it has been when men fought to protect does and
fawns."FN6
FN6. Faulkner, Go Down, Moses 339 (1940).
We juxtapose against Old Ike's double entendre Henry Wyatt's
pragmatism:
"We don't kill does because if we did kill does in a few years
there wouldn't even be any bucks left to kill, Uncle Ike".FN 7
FN7. Faulkner, Go Down, Moses 347 (1940).
Mississippi's rules regarding the nefarious hunting practices before the
court seemed similar to the understanding and approach found in other states.
And so I blended these:
Headlighting is unlawful in this state whether its victims be
buck, doe or fawn. Variously denominated "spotlighting",
"jacklighting", "shining deer", or simply "headlighting", this
conduct calls for more powerful words. Minnesota uses the term
"nefarious". State v. Suess, 236 Minn. 174, 183, 52 N.W.2d 409,
415 (1952). The New Mexico legislature has employed the
descriptive "despicable". State v. Barber, 91 N.M. 764, 765, 581
P.2d 27, 28 (1978). In this state "Snopesean" seems somehow
appropriate.
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In the first place, we are concerned with most unsportsmanlike
conduct. We do not purport to understand the physiological
process within the deer hit with a bright light at night but find
that it has been similarly described by courts in Ohio FN
MinnesotaFN9, Georgia FN10 and Virginia FN11 As noted in State
v. Suess, 236 Minn. 174, 52 N.W.2d 409 (1952),
FN8. State Division of Wildlife v. Barker, 8 Ohio St.3d 39,
457 N.E.2d 312 (1983) Jacklighting involves shining a
light into the eyes of the deer. The deer will then freeze,
making it an easy target for the hunter. 8 Ohio St.3d at
39, 457 N.E.2d at 313.
FN9. State v. Suess, 236 Minn. 174, 183, 52 N.W.2d 409,
415 (1952) (see quotation in text above).
FN1O. Stephens v. Lindsey, 304 F.Supp. 203
(S.D.Ga.1969)
The illegal hunters ride along in an automobile and
shine a light across the fields until the eyes of a deer are
spotted. The light mesmerizes the deer and they can be
easily shot. 304 F.Supp. at 204.
FN11. Yeatts v. Minton, 211 Va. 402, 403 n. 1, 177 S.E.2d
646, 467 n. 1 (1970) (quoting from Stephens v. Lindsey).
" . . . such animals freeze in their tracks when the rays of
a spotlight are suddenly cast upon them in the darkness
of the night and are then easy prey to the deadly aim of
an illegal hunter". 236 Minn. at 183, 52 N.W.2d at 415.
Not only is headlighting unsportsmanlike vis' a vis the
deer, the genuine sportsman is deprived of legitimate
hunting opportunities.
Poaching in general and headlighting in particular are the
product of baser motives, the thrill of the quick and easy kill and
the pursuit of profit. Precht, "To Catch a Poacher," Southern
Outdoors 38, 39 (Jan.-Feb.1982).
I rounded out the opinion with a brief discussion of other relevant
concerns:255
Discharge of firearms at night presents obvious dangers.
255. Pharr, 465 So.2d at 298-99.
310
PRA TICAL BENEFITS OF LITERATURE IN LAW
Hunting after dark is universally condemned. See, e.g., Miss.
Code Ann. 4 49-7-59 (Supp.1983). One does not have to look
far to find documented cases where deer headlighters have in the
pursuit of their sorry course killed or wounded innocent
bystanders FN12, game officials FN13 and valuable livestock. FN14
FN12. United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367, 376, 380, 383,
394 (5th Cir.1983) (nine year old boy killed by one
claiming to have been headlighting deer near Natchez
Trace).
FN13. Oney v. State, 397 A.2d 1374, 1376 (Del.1979)
(deer spotlighters fired on game official); Whitaker v.
Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 213 N.C. 376, 377, 196
S.E. 328, 328-29 (1938) (game warden killed by deer
headlighters).
FN14. State v. Openshaw, 172 Mont. 511, 513, 565 P.2d
319, 320 (1977) (defendant shot steer while headlighting
deer).
For these and other reasons, the practice of headlighting has
been made unlawful in practically every state in the Union. State
v. Morrison, 341 N.W.2d 635, 637-638 (S.D.1983) (cases cited
therein). It has been made expressly unlawful by the legislature
of this state and stiff penalties provided. Such, in and of itself, is
not enough, however, for the Snopesean poacher infects our
times, and
the woods and fields he ravages and the game he
devastates will be the consequence and signature of his
crime and guilt, and his punishment. FN15
FN15. Faulkner, Go Down, Moses 349 (1940).
Informed by these thoughts we proceed to our institutional
responsibility: the right interpretation and application of the law
followed by the adjudication of this criminal appeal.256
The opinions were finalized. Four justices thought Pharr had been subject
to an unfair stacking of offenses. This was an arguable position, but I thought
the dissent was a bit strong. The thick skin required of judges comes easy when
you have five votes. On December 5, 1984, Pharr v. State was handed down.
Deer season was still open. Would the press take notice, and, if so, how?
The next day the Jackson-based Clarion-Ledger, leading daily newspaper in
256. Pharr, 465 So. 2d at 299.
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Mississippi, had a front page story, headlined: "Court fires Faulkner at deer
spotlighters."2 57 What's more, I was the subject of a political cartoon, for the
first and only time in my life. I was depicted in judicial robe, legal opinion in
one hand, happily befriending a deer with my other arm. The Court was no
friend of deer headlighters or other poachers; that part was clear, but nothing in
that cartoon suggested any affection for the so-called legitimate hunters either.
Representing the Supreme Court of Mississippi, I had ruled for Bambi!
My strategy for getting publicity for the case had worked, but I am not sure
it was the kind of publicity Justice Lee had wanted. I had not seen that my
personal antipathy for deer hunting would be so apparent, much less that the
public would be told so. I do not recall Roy ever saying another word to me
about the case, although over time we developed a mutual respect and
friendship.258
Others, however, commented freely. I doubt Milton Pharr was impressed.
The four justice dissent made sure of that. I'm not sure the plight of the game
warden was made any easier, though I have no knowledge one way or the other.
Still, Pharr had communicated like no case I had been involved in. Lawyers and
trial judges would mention Pharr, always with a smile. It was a center point of
interest at a district bar Christmas gathering a couple of weeks later. For a time,
I would be introduced at civic club and other non-lawyer functions with mention
made of the deer headlighting case.
Only in the loosest sense was what happened after Pharr a function of my
intent, and certainly not of Justice Lee's intent. But there was no doubt that, if
the Faulkner quotes, the references to his fictional band-the Snopeses-had
been removed, no more note would have been taken than with any other case
that affirmed multiple misdemeanor convictions, with relatively modest
sentences.
Of course, I have no way of quantifying any good for society that had been
accomplished. Nor can I measure whether my Faulkner and other literary
references enhanced the credibility of the opinion, or gave anyone a sense that
the court understood the humanity of the law. As above, these were not my
thoughts as I was crafting the opinion. As takeaway, I realized I had stumbled
on to a tool for communicating with some undetermined portion of the public.259
And with some level of warm effect. At differing levels, I provided another
object lesson for those who read judicial opinions and wonder, "What was the
court thinking?"
257. Tom Brennan, Court Fires Faulkner at Deer Spotlighters, THE CLARION-LEDGER, Dec. 6, 1984, at
lA.
258. See Robertson, Remembering, supra note 246.
259. I cited Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 260-64 (1972) as precedent for my use of the strategy,
knowing that traditionalists might balk. If the U. S. Supreme Court considered this legitimate, that ought to be
worth something. I never let on at the time that "the Game" section in Flood is not well done, at least not in
my opinion. Others had practiced this strategy years earlier and with far greater skill than Flood. See, e.g.,
Montgomery, 151 S.E. at 364-66, discussed above. My research skills in the mid-1980s were less than what
they should have been.
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B. The Pharr Stratagem for Using Literature in a Legal Narrative Applied
1. The City of Clinton Beer Ban Referendum Case
Several years later, another case came along that seemed to call for more
than the traditional straight-forward appellate opinion-facts, procedural
context, law, law application, adjudication.2 60 Social, religious, economic and
political passions and proclivities were at play and in conflict. The court was
obliged to show publicly its understanding of the activity from which the case
had arisen, or at least a majority of the justices thought so.
One must understand that the sale and use of alcoholic beverages is an issue
which to this day vexes rural communities in the Bible Belt. Many counties and
towns are still legally dry.
Clinton, Mississippi, lies a few miles west of Jackson, the largest city and
capital of the state. Clinton is a college town, the center of which is Mississippi
College, a private Baptist school. M.C. has always had its share of enrollees
who find ways to experience that traditional student's rite of passage to
maturity-drinking beer. In the mid-1980s, church forces in Clinton organized
against the continued legal sale of beer.26 1  A then-recent substantial
enlargement of municipal corporate limits complicated the matter, though
politically and culturally unrelated to the legal beer dispute.2 62 Newly annexed
rural vendors suddenly found their livelihood at risk when 52.5% of participating
electors banned beer sales within the lately enlarged city limits - no matter that
these worthies had established their businesses in good faith, complied with the
law as it applied to them at the time, done business and sold beer for years, and
without apparent public inconvenience.263
It would have been easy enough for the court to say that the referendum was
or was not conducted in accordance with the law, and, if the former, the will of
the majority must be accepted. As it turned out, there had been procedural
irregularities.2 64 The final judgment was not likely to put an end to the matter.
Besides, the issue was certain to bobble up-time and again-in the state's more
rural communities, particularly in those that were home to small private church-
sponsored colleges and the state's numerous public community colleges, and
where rural houses of blues and other 'tonks still flourish.
Recalling the takeaway from Pharr, and after a procedural and factual
introduction to the case, I added these words for the court:265
260. City of Clinton v. Smith, 493 So. 2d 331 (Miss. 1986). See also, Boardman v. United States





265. I continued to cite Flood v. Kuhn in support of my strategy, and for the same tactical reasons as in
Pharr. By this time I had become aware of the then latest chapter in the litigational wars surrounding the
Chicago Cubs and management's way of doing business, the sixty-four page opinion of Circuit Judge Richard
L. Curry issued March 25, 1985, Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, No. 84CH 11384, slip op.
at 5 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County, Mar. 25, 1985), aff'g 483 N.E.2d 1245 (Ill. 1985); see also Mark F. Hazelwood,
Constitutional Law: Cubs Lose on Justice Ward's Error, 7 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 371 (1987).
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Our law is not and must never be regarded as an end in and of
itself but as a means to positive societal ends. One of those ends
is the tolerant accommodation of the conflicting values, beliefs,
fears and self-interests of a pluralistic people. We seek to
structure and administer our law that we be enabled better to live
and let live. This being so, rather than deliver an arid legal
opinion, we regard it as appropriate that we have in mind that
ambiguous slice of life implicated in today's controversy. FN2
FN2 Compare Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 260-64, 92
S.Ct. 2099, 2100-2103, 32 L.Ed.2d 728, 732-33 (1922);
and Pharr v. State, 465 So.2d 294, 297-99 (Miss.1984).
This case is but the latest in our people's seemingly unending
struggle over the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages.
Few issues have so tested our fidelity to law, nor presented
greater tensions within our law's capacity to accommodate the
will of the majority with respect for the privacy, integrity and
sensibilities of the individual. We have expended untold
quantities of time, energy, oratory and money battling the
bottle,FN3 and as this case makes clear the nd is not in sight. The
lessons of three thousand years of the history of Western
civilization are at least two: (1) that strong drink will be
consumed by our people in varying quantities regardless of what
the law may provide and (2) that such consumption will, as it
always has, disturb us and our neighbors in forms ranging from
inconvenience to tragedy, which from time to time will motivate
some to employ the law to ban it.
FN3. A few of our many legal battles fought in a variety
of contexts, include Dunagin v. City of Oxford, Miss.,
718 F.2d 738 (5th Cir.1983) (challenge to ban on
advertising sale of alcoholic beverages); Lee County
Drys v. Anderson, 231 Miss. 222, 95 So.2d 224 (1957)
(legality of petition for beer sales referendum in
Tupelo); and Edmonds v. Delta Democrat Publishing
Co., 230 Miss. 583, 93 So.2d 171 (1957) (libel action
arising out of statewide liquor legalization referendum).
The spirit besieged today has long been with us. In Xenophon's
Anabasis penned in 398 B.C. we find these words:
They had beer to drink, very strong when not mixed
with water, but agreeable to those accustomed to it.
Beer has had its poetic defenders over the centuries. We recall
John Still, bishop of Bath and Wells, fellow of Christ's College
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in the late Sixteenth Century, for his lusty appreciation of "jolly
good ale and old" in his poem In Praise ofAle. Of the power of
malt, A.E. Housman perceived that
many a peer of England brews livelier liquor than the
Muse, and malt does more than Milton can to justify
God's ways to man.FN4
FN4. Housman, A Shropshire Lad, LXII, 91 (1984 ed.).
Ben Jonson regarded beer an inferior drink. It has always cost
less than other alcoholic beverages, and for this reason has
enjoyed widespread popularity among working class people and
the poor. College students throughout the Western world-from
the tables down at Mory's to Heidelberg's Inn of the Three
Golden Apples, from the Warehouse[266] to the Crossroads[267]
to the End Zone[2 68]-have had a special affection for beer, the
encounter with which is almost a required rite of passage to
young adulthood. It has emboldened many a student to olympian
sophomoric heights, never to be forgotten nor, 'tis hoped,
repeated. FN5 This in mind, as well that the scene of today's
controversy is a college town, we recall Richard Hovey's
tolerant reminder
FN5. Sepmeier v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc., 461 So.2d
193 (Fla.App.1984), describes the saga of beer drinking
streakers at Florida State University "with more courage
than assets". 461 So.2d at 194 n. 1.
that God is not censorious when his children have their fling. FN6
FN6. Hovey, A Stein Song, reprinted in The Stag's
Hornbook 143, 144 (McClure ed. 1945).
More soberly, Thomas Jefferson, almost as famous as a
connoisseur of fine wines as he was a political leader and
theorist, wrote of beer in 1815:
I wish to see this beverage become common i stead of
the whiskey which kills one-third of our citizens and
266. The Warehouse in Oxford, Mississippi was at the time a favorite watering hole for students at the
University of Mississippi.
267. The Crossroads, in Oktibbeha County east of Starkville, Mississippi, was at the time the watering
hole of choice for students at the Mississippi State University, and some of their more daring dates from
Mississippi University for Women in Columbus, Mississippi.
268. The End Zone in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, was then the venue of choice for students attending the
University of Southern Mississippi, and no doubt more than a few from church-related William Carey College.
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ruins their families.
Not even beer always produces harmless endings, as the legal
reports of this state and nation, reflecting as they do only the tip
of the iceberg, are replete with cases of persons who have
imbibed excessively and inflicted serious personal injuryFN
wrongful death F, and engaged in destructive and seemingly
senseless criminal activity including murder , manslaughter
FN10 , aggravated assault FN11, and threats of bodily harm to
others FN12. We put our heads in the sand if we ignore the darker
side of beer.
FN7 Hill v. Dunaway, 487 So.2d 807 (Miss.1986);
Griffin v. Holliday, 233 So.2d 820 (Miss.1970);
Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir.1979).
FN8. Saxton v. Rose, 201 Miss. 814, 29 So.2d 646 (1947);
Hubbard v. Estate of Havlik, 213 Kan. 594, 518 P.2d
352 (1974).
FN9. Stevens v. State, 458 So.2d 726 (Miss.1984);
Lambert v. State, 462 So.2d 308 (Miss.1984); Fairchild
v. State, 459 So.2d 793 (Miss.1984).
FN10. Cook v. State, 467 So.2d 203 (Miss.1985).
FN11. Watson v. State, 465 So.2d 1025 (Miss.1985); Gray
v. State, 427 So.2d 1363 (Miss.1983) and State v.
Clements, 383 So.2d 818 (Miss.1980).
FN12. Swanson v. Wesley College, Inc., 402 A.2d 401
(Del.Super. 1979).
The struggle to ban beer and other forms of booze suggests
further reflections. Barroom settings and the availability of a
choice of physiological aids have provided credible vehicles our
poets, playwrights and philosophers have used to penetrate our
souls. W.H. Auden begins The Age ofAnxiety with four wartime
lonlies [sic] in a New York bar and by the time Malin watches
the sun rise from behind the East River has produced a powerful
and prophetic declaration of hope, grounded in the sacrifice of
the Christ. Eugene O'Neill employs a like setting as The Iceman
Cometh teaches that the "lie of the pipe dream ... [is] what
gives life",2 69 and confronts the inevitability of death as have
269. Eugene O'Neill, per Larry Spade: "As the history of the world proves, the truth has no bearing on
anything. It's irrelevant and immaterial, as the lawyers say. The lie of a pipe dream is what gives life to the
whole misbegotten mad lot of us . . . ." EUGENE O'NEILL, THE ICEMAN COMETH, act 1, in COMPLETE PLAYS,
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few others. Albert Camus chooses an Amsterdam bar in The
Fall from which his fallen lawyer, Jean Baptiste Clamence,
teaches us that genuine and unreserved personal penitence is the
sole valid prerequisite to "the right to judge others."
In more popular mediums, the prime time television series,
Cheers, and Billy Joel's recent song, "Piano Man," employ the
barroom genre to make us laugh, cry and understand life.
Without these and so many others, we would be the poorer. Yet
we are poorer for the hardship, misery, crime and tragedy
occasionally the proximate result of excessive consumption of
alcoholic beverages. Our experience with strong drink is as rich
with complexity and ambiguity as it is inevitable.
Our law is the witness and external deposit of the values and
culture of our society. Pharr v. State, 465 So.2d 294, 297
(Miss. 1984). Seldom has our law attempted to regulate an area
of our lives where our values have been so in conflict. The best
known expression of that value conflict in this state is the 1952
Whiskey Speech of former Circuit Judge Noah S. Sweat, Jr., of
Corinth. That speech blends the sober with the delightful and
bears recitation in its entirety.
My Friends:
I had not intended to discuss this controversial subject at
this particular time. However, I want you to know that I
do not shun controversy. On the contrary, I will take a
stand on any issue at any time, regardless of how
fraught with controversy it might be. You have asked
me how I feel about whiskey. All right, here is how I
feel about whiskey ...
If when you say whiskey you mean the devil's brew, the
poison scourge, the bloody monster, that defiles
innocence, dethrones reason, destroys the home, creates
misery and poverty, yes, literally takes the bread from
the mouths of little children; if you mean the evil drink
that topples the Christian man and woman from the
pinnacle of righteousness, gracious living into the
bottomless pit of degradation, and despair, and shame,
and helplessness, and hopelessness, then certainly I am
against it.
But,
1932-1943, at 569-570 (Library of America 1988).
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If when you say whiskey you mean the oil of
conversation, the philosophic wine, the ale that is
consumed when good fellows get together, that puts a
song in their hearts and laughter on their lips, and the
warm glow of contentment in their eyes; if you mean
Christmas cheer; if you mean the stimulating drink that
puts the spring into the old gentleman's step on a frosty,
crispy morning; if you mean the drink which enables a
man to magnify his joy, and his happiness, and to forget,
if only for a little while, life's great tragedies, and
heartaches, and sorrows; if you mean that drink, the sale
of which pours into our treasuries untold millions of
dollars, which are used to provide tender care for our
little crippled children, our blind, our deaf, our dumb,
our pitiful aged and infirm; to build highways and
hospitals and schools, then certainly I am for it.
This is my stand. I will not retreat from it. I will not
compromise. FN13
FN13. Judge Sweat's Whiskey Speech, together with an
account of its origins, appear in M. Hughes, Judge
Sweat and "The Original Whiskey Speech ", The Jurist
(Vol. I, No. 2, Spring, 1986) at pp. 16-17.
Informed by these thoughts, we proceed to our institutional
responsibility: the right interpretation and application of our law
regarding beer sales referendum elections.2 70
The public effect of the Clinton beer referendum case was not unlike what
we had seen in Pharr. The next day, the Clarion-Ledger had a front page story,
"Clinton beer case goes belly up, says the bar."27 1 I was pleased (as would have
been my late friend, Soggy Sweat) with the balance-providing, emboldened, and
bracketed insert, "We put our heads in the sand when we ignore the darker side
of beer" - Mississippi Supreme Court. Did the quotes from the Bishop of Bath
and Wells, from Housman, from Camus and the others form a part of the legal
reasoning that led to the final adjudication in City of Clinton v. Smith? Of course
not. Did Part III of the opinion persuade anyone to change his or her mind about
whether the sale of beer should be legal? I doubt it. Did it add to anyone's sense
that the Court had made a reliable and just decision? Maybe. But to some never
knowable extent Part III did communicate to the public that the court had a
humane understanding of the activity that had given rise to this case, and 'tis to
be hoped at least a few of other cases past and to come.
270. City of Clinton v. Smith, 493 So. 2d 331, 334-336 (Miss 1986).
271. Tom Brennan, Clinton Beer Case Goes Belly up, Says the Bar, THE CLARION-LEDGER, Aug. 17,
1986, at lA.
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Whether Part III works is for others to decide. Could it have been done
better? A more deft hand, a more well-read author may have generated a better
draft. Was a Part III type exposition appropriate in a formal judicial opinion of
the highest court of the state? I think so, but not everyone agrees. My wise
colleague and friend of years, Justice Armis Hawkins, said, "For my part, I
would have preferred that Part III be omitted from the opinion."272 I hope I am
not unfairly talking out of school when I say that, as we were discussing the case
in panel conference, it was Justice Hawkins who reminded me of the Housman
quote that "malt does more than Milton can to justify God's ways to man," and
with a twinkle in his eye and other evidence of great delight.273
In Flood v. Kuhn, Chief Justice Burger and Justice White similarly
suggested that Justice Blackmon's section "The Game" was inappropriate.274
"Stuffed shirts" such judges are commonly called, though it doesn't mean they
were not good judges.
I do recall that for a time in and after August of 1986 anecdotal evidence
abounded, suggesting that in the aggregate Part III's numerous references from
literature and popular culture communicated a humanity about the court and its
approach to such public issues. Again, at the risk of talking out of school, all
nine justices serving on the Supreme Court of Mississippi in August of 1986
were social drinkers. Four were Baptists.
2. A Case About A Fine Fishin' Hole
In 1990, a case arose amidst the contentious question of whether ordinary
folk in the Mississippi Delta had places where they could fish.275 As with deer
headlighting in Pharr and beer drinking in City of Clinton, something more than
the ordinary appellate opinion seemed appropriate. The introductory paragraph
speaks for itself:
This is a case about a fishin' hole. It lies in western Bolivar
County near the River, and at birth was named Beulah Crevasse,
though many have long called it the Merigold Blue Hole. People
who can get there without trespassing on land want to enter and
fish. Landowners and their long time lessee hunting club want
just as badly to keep the public out. The relative scarcity of good
fishing spots, landowners' bona fide needs for protection of their
valuable timber and water resources, club members' desire for
undisturbed aesthetic and sporting enjoyment of the blue hole
they have long thought theirs, the violent life of Old Man River,
notions of fish as ferrae naturae, and, as well, the human
penchant for confusing want with right, desire with entitlement,
272. City of Clinton, 493 So. 2d at 342 (Hawkins, J., specially concurring).
273. A few of my many cherished memories of my late friend Armis Hawkins are put forth publicly in
Robertson, Variation, supra note 39, at 497, 513, 561, 571, 641, 675 (2015), and Robertson, A Life, supra note
44.
274. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 285 (1972).
275. Dycus v. Sillers, 557 So. 2d 486 (Miss. 1990).
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and the familiar with the necessary-these and more form
important background forces driving this civil warfare which we
are charged to channel within the levees of the law.276
This opening is followed by a tale of the language and lore and life of
fishing in the Deep South. Informally, my tale-presented below-is made up
of some seven dimensions, hopefully flowing as easily as good fishing streams
from each dip or bend to the next. The reader is told what he needs that he may
feel and see with his several senses the cultural and natural dimensions of civil
warfare before the court for decision. The full history of the case is then set
out,277 but it is not enough. Nor is conventional judicial narrative enough. This
story of a case about a fine fishin' hole needs the touch of the poet, the novelist,
the essayist, and so these are strung together, fresh caught and not so fresh
caught excerpts from familiar and not so familiar pens, only two of which-
those of Mark Twain and James Dickey-are without deep Mississippi roots.
Skip the footnotes as you read part II. Footnotes are a necessary scourge of
legal writing, needed here to guard against the notion that what follows is just
one big "fin whopper," to plagiarize a favorite phrase of Nash Buckingham,
noted below. Would that the footnotes could be presented as endnotes. So
without more:
This is also a case about a people, the waters they fish, and a
unique culture and lore. These form an ambiguous but real part
of our life whose pulse is preserved in the product of our poets
from the famous to the obscure.FN1
FN1. More often than we dare or can admit, law's lame
language cannot convey the realities and mood of the
matter the judge must adjudge. Compare McInnis v.
State, 527 So.2d 84, 89 (Miss.1988); City of Clinton v.
Smith, 493 So.2d 331, 334-36 (Miss.1986); Pharr v.
State, 465 So.2d 294, 297-99 (Miss.1984); see also
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 260-64, 92 S.Ct. 2099,
2100-2103, 32 L.Ed.2d 728, 732-33 (1972). Today's is
such a case.
Many think fishing the most leisurely of leisure activities, the
positive pursuit of the lazy. In describing his childhood in Yazoo
County, Willie Morris recalls
We did cane-pole fishing, both to save money and
because it was lazier, for we seldom exerted ourselves
on these trips to Wolf Lake or Five Mile.FN2
276. Id. at 487.
277. See Part III of Dycus, 557 So. 2d at 493-497.
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FN2. W. Morris, North Toward Home 75 (1967).
It was a leisure to be consumed and cherished, a spot in the
shade preferred, and whether the fish were biting was secondary.
When the biting was good, we might bring home twenty
or thirty white perch or bream or goggle-eye; when it
was bad we would simply go to sleep in the boat. FN3
FN3. Id.
But there was always a Miss Julia Mortimer, the local school
marm, revered in time but then the scourge of every young
Willie Morris, Miss Julia who'd "get behind some barefooted
boy and push," said Uncle Percy. "She put an end to good
fishing," FN4
FN4. E. Welty, Losing Battles 235 (1970).
Outside the home, we boys was more used to sitting on
the bridge fishing than lining the recitation bench. Now
she wanted that changed, FN5
FN5. Id. at 236.
Uncle Curtis remembered of Miss Julia.
Fishing is a part of the very life and being of many in
Mississippi, as with Eudora Welty's enigmatic Billy Floyd, of
whom "it was said by the old ladies that he slept all morning for
he fished all night," FN6 and who Jenny noticed when he walked
down the street because "his wrist hung with a great long
catfish." FN7 Ellen Douglas' Estella, who had just given birth
said "Baby or no baby, I got to go fishing after such a fine rain,"
FN8 the same Estella in whose fishing style Douglas sees poetry,
Estella who
FN6- E. Welty, "At the Landing" in Collected Stories 243
(1980).
FN7. Id. at 240.
F E. Douglas, "Hold On" in Black Cloud White Cloud
166 (1963).
addressed herself to the business of fishing with such
delight and concentrationFalse She stood over the pool
like a priestess at her altar, all expectation and
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willingness, holding the pole lightly as if her fingers
could read the intentions of the fish vibrating through
line and pole. FN9
FN9. Id. at 171.
Then there is Walker Percy's Anna Castagna, Binx Bolling's
mother, who "looks like the women you see fishing from
highway bridges," FN10 who sits on the porch overlooking the
water at Bayou des Allemands and
FN1O. W. Percy, The Moviegoer 148 (1961).
casts in a big looping straight-arm swing, a clumsy yet
practiced movement that ends with her wrist bent in in a
womanish angle. The reel sings and the lead sails far
and wide with its gyrating shrimp and lands with hardly
a splash in the light etherish water. Mother holds still for
a second, listening intently as if she meant to learn what
the fishes thought of it, and reels in slowly, twitching
the rod from time to time. FN11
FN11. Id.
Many Mississippians, including our own Chief Justice Roy
Noble Lee,
feel that a person who has never . .. angled for bass or
caught bream on a light line and rod, or taken catfish
from a trotline and limb hook, has never lived. FN12
FN12. Strong v. Bostick, 420 So.2d 1356, 1364
(Miss.1982), quoted in Pharr v. State, 465 So.2d 294 at
298.
Still, some of us are like Faulkner's Lucius Priest who at age 11,
when Uncle Parsham asked, "Do you like to go fishing?,"
thought "I didn't really like it. I couldn't seem to learn to want-
or maybe want to learn-to be still that long," but said quickly:
"Yes, sir." FN13 Lucius, being led to Mary's fishing hole,
FN13. W. Faulkner, The Reivers 248 (1962).
sat on the log, in a gentle whine of mosquitoesFalse
Then I even thought about putting one of Lycurgus's
crickets on the hook, but the crickets were not always
easy to catchFalse [When nighttime finally fell and
322
PRA TICAL BENEFITS OF LITERATURE IN LAW
Uncle Parsham returned,] "had a bite yet?" [Lucius
finally confessed,] "I ain't much of a fisherman," I said,
"how do your hounds hunt?" FN14
FN14. Id. at 249.
Binx Bolling was of Lucius' mind, though it is doubtful they had
anything else in common. "You know I don't like to fish," Binx
said to this mother.
"That's true," she says after a while, "You never did.
You're just like your fatherFalse. He didn't like to
fish?" FN15
FN15. W. Percy, The Moviegoer 149 (1961).
And so of Preston Cunningham, FN16 even though his unwitting
son, Carroll, had had a pond dug for him beyond the yard
"stocked with bass and perch."
FN16. B. Lowry, Emma Blue 34 (1978).
But even for those who warm to it so much more than Lucius
and Preston and Binx, and maybe even Binx' father, fishing is
not the central motion of our outdoor life but is always second
fiddle to the hunt. Not quite the afterthought, it is the interlude,
the escape, relaxation, almost taken for granted until you can't
fish, not nearly so enobling or paradoxical as hunting the deer,
with its ritual rite of passage of adolescence and loss of
innocence as when the old half-Indian Sam Fathers "dipped his
hands into the hot blood" and marked young Ike McCaslin's
face teaching him humility and pride.FN17
FN17. W. Faulkner, Go Down, Moses 165, 350-51 (1942).
Perhaps it is because the fish is less like us-and more plentiful
and more familiar, it is not the centerpiece but the analogy, the
simile, as Ike thought as the bear disappeared into the woods:
It faded, sank bank into the wilderness without motion
as he had watched a fish, a huge ole bass, sink back into
the dark depths of its pool and vanish without even any
movement of its fins. FN18
FN18. Id. at 209.
Or Eudora Welty's "[m]uscadine spread under the waters
rippling their leaves like schools of fishes." FN19 Will Barrett's
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"knee leapt like a fish." FN20 Gary, Larry Brown's lonesome
night hawk, found Connie "cold as a fish" FN21 And from
Beverly Lowry: Might have been pleasant. Looking at his white
behind-the-ear skin. White as a cooked perch, Emma Blue
wistfully thought after she had refused John Robert's offer of a
ride to school. FN22
FN19. E. Welty, supra, note 6 at 251.
FN20. W. Percy, The Last Gentleman 187 (1966).
FN21. L. Brown, "Night Life" in Facing the Music 116
(1988).
FN22. B. Lowry, Emma Blue 19 (1978).
Fish furnish less pleasant images. Again, Welty, describing the
house after the floodwaters had receded:
"That slime, that's just as slick! You know how a fish is,
I expect," the postmaster was saying affably to both of
them, .. . "That's the way a house is, been under water."
FN23
FN23 E. Welty, supra, note 6 at 248.
Mississippi's game fish are of many stripes, their personalities
as different as our people. There are the bream, Nash
Buckingham's "matchless little marauders" FN24, but the biggest,
little bigger than the size of your hand, FN25 to any objective
observer "the sweetest eatin' there is." FN26 There are the perch
and crappie, but little poetry about these.
FN24. N. Buckingham, "Jailbreak" in Game Bag, 165
(1943).
FN25. E. Douglas, supra, note 8 at 171.
FN26. See J. Autry, "Fishing Day" in Life After
Mississippi 3 (1989).
Then there is the large mouth bass, Buckingham's "leviathans,"
FN27 "placed in the waters of the South so that fishermen have a
preordained reason for idleness and spending money." FN28
Outdoorsman Jim McCafferty says of bass: "This savage fighter
will attack the right crank bait with all the fury of a treed
wildcat." FN29 Fishing for white bass on the oxbow lakes in the
Delta, McCafferty exaggerates only slightly when he talks of
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"his duels with bruising white bass tak[ing] on an image of a
sheriff looking for the outlaws." FN30 David Chapman Berry,
who grew up in the Delta, encounters the bass and is moved to
poetry:
FN27. N. Buckingham, "The Sally Hole" in The Tattered
Coat, 55 (1939).
FN28. G. Morris, "Fishing", in Encyclopedia of Southern
Culture, 1221 (1989).
FN29. j. McCafferty, "White Bass Basics", in MS
Outdoors 8 (March, 1983).
FN30. Id. at 16.
Stump in the pond, stump in my eye, My fly pops inches
from the stump. Bass, all wrist, roiling deep in thought,
wedge from the bottom of the headpan, and buckling the
surface under the fly, blur through their tunnel of scales,
shattering the mirrory surface, the fly engorged, the fly,
the fly leading the bass by the lip. I break their heads
with the butt of the Buck knife. They stiffen
shimmering. Scaling rakes the silver off mirrors-my raw
eye a dump of shimmers? I eat fish to keep my head
stocked. Some fellows refinish mirrors, but I eat fish to
restore ponds. Don't believe it that life's only a matter
of how you look at it. Smell my hands. FN31
FN31. D. Berry, "Bass" in An Anthology of Mississippi
Writers (Polk and Scafidel eds.) 502 (1979).
Finally, is the ubiquitous catfish, of the family ictaluridae, the
blue, the channel and the flathead, of whom legends transcend
the fact-fiction dichotomy. A gargantuan catfish bumped into
Marquette's canoe, almost prompting the French explorer to
believe what the Indians had told him about the river's roaring
demon. FN32 Huckleberry Finn and Jim caught a catfish that was
as big as a man and "weighed over two hundred pounds." FN33
Hodding Carter claimed to have "gigged a catfish that measured
almost five feet in length." FN34 Though still regarded rough fish,
channel catfish farming has become the nation's leading
aquaculture industry with Mississippi producing an estimated
200,000,000 pounds of farm-raised catfish a year.
FN32. Young, "Catfish" in Encyclopedia of Southern
Culture, 378 (1989).
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FN33. M. Twain, Huckleberry Finn 60 (1885).
FN34. H. Carter, Man and the River: The Mississippi 30-
31(1970).
The fisherman's tackle and gear vary widely, from the cane pole
used to fish for bream and catfish. The legendary Kentucky reel
is still the favorite of the bass fisherman. FN35 Brooks Haxton
tells of jug fishing. "[Y]ou took gallon jugs. Empty Clorox
bottles were the best." FN36 Hodding Carter jugfished for catfish.
FN35. See Henshaw, "Evolution of the Kentucky Reel" in
Outing Magazine.
FN36. B. Haxton, "To Be a Jug Fisherman" Dead
Reckoning, 84(1989). Haxton's powerful poem reminds
us of other realities of jug fishing for catfish and for life.
In jug fishing-to explain to the uninitiated-empty,
gaudily-painted gallon jugs float downstream, each
dangling a heavy cord and hook and smelly bait from its
corked mouth. The fisherman's boat follows lazily.
When the catfish strikes, under go jug and fish and both
remain there until the fish's strength is gone. There both
erupt into the air and the fisherman approaches to pull in
his catch. Incidentally, you don't scale a catfish. You
nail him against a tree or barn and-since he has no
scales, but a heavy, tough skin-you skin him. FN37
FN37. H. Carter, supra, note 34 at 30-31 (1970).
The Encyclopedia of Southern Culture suggests a
corrolation between the economic and social stature of
fishermen, the game fish they pursue, and the method
they prefer to use. At the bottom of the economic scale,
the preferred fishing is catfish/bream by cork or bobber
fishing/bait casting, bass/spinner fishing is the choice of
blue collar families, bass fly-rod fishing of white collar
workers, and artificial fly fishing for native trout is the
preserve of upper income professionals. FN38
FN38. G. Morris, "Fishing", in Encyclopedia of Southern
Culture, 1221 (1989).
The point is belied by Ellen Douglas' ten-year-old Ralph
Glover, hardly a child of poverty or disadvantage.
326
PRA TICAL BENEFITS OF LITERATURE IN LA W 327
"I brought my gig," Ralph said, as they all trudged
across the levee toward the Yacht Club. "I'm going to
gig one of those great big buffalo or a gar or
something." FN39
FN39. E. Douglas, supra, note 8 at p. 168.
Still few would deny Larry Brown's truth:
The rich have never seined minnows to impale upon
hooks for pond bass. The rich do not camp out. The
rich have never been inside a mobile home. FN40
FN40. L. Brown, "The Rich" in Facing the Music 38
(1988).
Not every Mississippi fisherman experiences what Mabry
Anderson calls "the hypnotic lure of the outdoors." FN41 Consider
the Yocono River, Faulkner's Yoknapatawpha River, starkly
seen by James Seay in his "Grabbling in Yokna Bottom."FN42
FN41. M. Anderson, Outdoor Observations 166 (1977).
FN42. j. Seay, "Grabbling in Yokna Bottom" in Let Not
Your Hart (1970).
The hungry come in a dry time
To muddy the water of this swamp river
And take in nets what fish or eel
Break surface to suck at this world's air.
But colder blood backs into the water's wood-
Gills the silt rather than rise to light-
And who would eat a cleaner meat
Must grabble in the hollows of underwater stumps and
roots,
Must cram his arm and hand beneath the scum
And go by touch where eye cannot reach,
Must seize and bring to light
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What scale or slime is touched-
Must in that instant-on touch-
Without question or reckoning
Grab up what wraps itself cold-blooded
Around flesh or flails the water to froth,
Or else feel the fish slip by,
Or learn that the loggerhead's jaw is thunder-deaf,
Or that the cottonmouth's fangs burn like heated needles
Even under water.
The well-fed do not wade this low river.
Mississippi is "the only state with a season for . .. [grabblin']."
FN43 Others compelled to fish are left by law and society no
choice but to fish in such undesirable places as the ramp at Ellen
Douglas' Lake Okatukla leading to the Phillipi Yacht Club.
FN43. J. Autry, "Grabblin' " in Life After Mississippi 10 (1989).
Even in this terrible heat, at noon on the hottest day of the year,
breathing this foul, fishy air, there will always be a few people
fishing off the terminal barges, bringing in a slimy catfish or a
half-dead bream from the oily water, raising their long cane
poles and casting out their bait over and over again with
dreamlike deliberation,... FN44
FN44. E. Douglas, supra, note 8, 161-62 (1963).
Of course, mention of Huck Finn's and Hodding Carter's catfish
tales suggests another inexorable feature of fishing, what Nash
Buckingham called "finwhoppers."
The worst of us get fed up and bored with pure, unadulterated
lying. But a certain amount of rod and reel spoofing is
absolutely essential to salve conscience, offset temptation and
lend color. FN45
FN45. N. Buckingham, "Over the Brook Cedron," in Ole Miss
111 (1937).
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Barry Hannah tells us of water liars of another dimension in his
story about "Farte Cove off the Yazoo River ... where the old
liars are still snapping and wheezing at one another."
"MacIntire, a Presbyterian preacher, I seen him come out here
with his son-and-law, anchor near the bridge, and pull up fifty or
more white perch big as small pumpkins. You know what they
was using for bait?"
"What?" asked another geezer.
"Nuthin. Caught on the bare hook. It was Gawd made them fish
bite," said Sidney Farte, going at it good.
"Naw. There be a season they bite a bare hook. Gawd didn't
have to've done that," said another old guy, with a fringe of red
hair and a racy Florida shirt. FN46
FN46 B. Hannah, "Water Liars" in Airships 5 (1978).
Like tales are told at the Coffee Shop off the square in Clanton,
Mississippi, where the folks talk "local politics, football and
bass fishing." FN47
FN47. J. Grisham, A Time to Kill 23-24 (1989).
Fishermen see a different world than the rest of us. According to
Mabry Anderson, "Unless you are over forty years old and a
bream fisherman, you probably think a cockroach is just a dirty
black bug." FN48 They humanize these unhuman-like piscators,
often talking the fish into the boat. FN49 Lawyer Frank Wynne, a
witness at trial, describing the contours of the Merigold Blue
Hole, how the waters back out when the River is falling, lapses
and tells of "a good fishing place" back where the waters come
out of the woods and over the road. "I'll tell you what, you can
go in there and catch a nice bass," and through the cold record
his smile and priorities are seen.
FN48. M. Anderson, Outdoor Observations 132 (1977).
FN49 E. Douglas, supra, note 8, at 171; and Anderson,
Outdoor Observations at 161, 163 (1977).
The waters as well compete for bragging rights. The night
before on what Doc had called "the best river dragging he'd ever
been on," William Wallace had said "There is nothing in the
world as good as . .. fish. The fish of the Pearl River." FN50 But
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none is the source of more lore and awe than the Mississippi.
David Cohn said in the Delta, folks "fear God and the
Mississippi River." FN51 Mabry Anderson said, "The Old Man
just rolls on and on and wipes out most of man's mistakes each
spring when it charges right out of its banks." FN52
FN50 E. Welty, "The Wide Net," in Collected Stories 181
(1980).
FN51 D. Cohn, Where I Was Born and Raised 43 (1948).
FN52. M. Anderson, Outdoor Observations 41 (1977).
No man alive can bob about on its surface in a puny
fourteen-foot boat when the gauge is showing fifty feet
or more at Helena, Arkansas, without becoming a little
more tolerant and just a little less sure of himself. FN53
FN53. M. Anderson, Outdoor Observations 41 (1977).
Still some see a flood a blessing, some like Luke Wallin's
Watersmith and his sons Jesse and Bean and Robert Elmer who
fish the Mock Orange Slough.
They waded in the muddy cool water up to their waists,
False On their first pass they got a bucketful of bluegills
and a small catfish. They wiped the mud and sticks from
the net to try again.
"Every time the river floods," Paw said, "it brings us all
these here treasures."
"Sho does," Bean said.
"I think it's fine," Paw went on. "I think it's right nice
of the old river."FN
54
FN54. L. Wallin, "The Redneck Poacher's Son" in I
Mississippi Writers: Reflections of Childhood and
Youth: Fiction 618 (D. Abbott ed., 1985).
This is a case about a fishin' hole, and the people who contest
for it and care for it so variously, who are charged by the infinite
to accept it in its ambivalence and antinomy. Such a fishin' hole
is Lake Chatula in the far southwest corner of Ford County
which
in the spring . . . hold[s] the distinction of being the
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largest body of water in Mississippi. But by late summer
the rains were gone, and the sun would cook the shallow
water until the lake would dehydrate. Its once ambitious
shore lines would retreat . . ., creating a depthless basin
of reddish brown water. FN55
FN55. J. Grisham, supra, note 47 at 11.
James Dickey has spoken of this connection between person and
place, between man and a lake that once
... was deep flashing-
Tiny grid-like waves wire-touched water-
No more, and comes what is left
Of the gone depths duly arriving
Into the weeds belly-up:
one carp now knowing grass
And also thorn-shucks and seeds
Can outstay him:
A hundred acres of canceled water come down
To death-mud shaking
Its one pool stomach-pool holding the dead one diving
up
Busting his gut in weeds in scum-gruel glowing with
belly-white
Unhooked around him all grass in a bristling sail taking
off back-
blowing. Here in the dry hood I am watching
Alone, in my tribal sweat my people gone my fish
rolling
Beneath me and I die
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Waiting will wait out
The blank judgment given only
In ruination's suck-holing acre wait and make the sound
surrounding NO
Laugh primally: be
Like an open-gut flash an open under-
water eye with the thumb
pressure to brain the winter-wool head of me,
Spinning my guts with my fish in the old place,
Suffering its consequences, dying,
Living up to it. FN56
FN56. J. Dickey, "Remnant Water" in The Central
Motion: Poems, 1968-1979 108-109 (1983).
Beulah Crevasse is but ninety-two acres of not yet cancelled
water, and to those who war so over it Dickey seems to say that,
if you like it when it is beautiful and serene and full of life, you
must accept it-love it-equally when it has been taken away by
nature and become but a mudhole with a dead carp in it, or when
it has been taken by man, by the social invention he calls law.
Dickey had these in mind when he said of such waters
[Y]ou have to accept the "gone depths" as well as the
real depths that used to be there when the lake was
whole, the dead fish as well as the live ones, the
repulsive aspects of the scene as well as the beautiful
ones that have disappeared: and if you are left with
"ruination's suck-holing acre" it is your due: you know
this and accept it, even with a kind of exultation,
because the bond between you and the lake still exists
no matter what, and you can therefore "laugh primally,"
maybe no better than the dead belly-up fish but still, like
he, in the old place, where you both belong, and know
it.
We are informed by these thoughts, knowing that law is about
life, that law is not an end but a means to the end of a society in
which all should want to live, with its paradox and ambiguity, its
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irony and contrariety even that the law has wrought. We proceed
to our institutional responsibility: the right interpretation and
application of our law regarding rights to these waters.27 8
The core social issue in Dycus was whether ordinary folk had reasonable
access to waters in which to fish. The dispute arose in the cultural context,
where many believed they had a natural right to fish. Many felt this "natural
right" was being eviscerated as a practical matter as all of the good fishing holes
in the Mississippi Delta were coming under the control of timber companies and
their private hunting and fishing club lessees with exclusive and expensive
membership criteria. I tried to show respect for that culture and social conflict
(the legislative facts, if you will) through the literature and lore of fishing in
Mississippi, though in the end the history and law made it clear that the waters at
issue, the Merigold Blue Hole in Bolivar County, Mississippi, were susceptible
of private ownership. I received a telephone call after Dycus was released and
final from Chancery Judge William H. Bizzell, a very wise man from Cleveland,
Mississippi, whom I have known for years. Judge Bizzell had recused himself
from Dycus at the trial level because he knew all of the parties and the many
others who would be affected by the decision; hence, we were free to discuss the
case after the fact. Nothing pleased me more than Bill Bizzell's statement, "The
first part of your opinion (use of literature to explain the culture and social
conflict) is more important than the legal analysis that comes later."
On the other hand, Chief Justice Roy Noble Lee demurred and two others
joined him.2 79 Yes, the same Roy Noble Lee who deserves a bit of the blame for
my literary efforts going back to Pharr in 1984, but who may not have been
entirely pleased that my opinion in Pharr was seen as siding with Bambi. And
who once waxed poetic himself such that I quoted him, hoping to keep his
vote.28 0 Whether I presented Part II of Dycus v. Sillers in a way that pleases is a
matter of the tastes of the reader, who has every right to skip Part II altogether
and get on with the more conventional stuff. In self-defense, I offer only that
there is a reason why our schools teach poetry and prose, and not turgid lawyer
talk.
V. THE AMBIGUITY OF ALL THINGS HUMAN, MOST PARTICULARLY MAN
HIMSELF
In the late 1980s, the human circumstances of James Dycus and the other
three Dycuses, and of Charley Allen and Allen Ford were unexceptionable.
They loved to fish, for any number of the reasons captured in Part II of Dycus.
The Sillers family was Delta aristocracy. They were landowners, whose lessee
the Merigold Hunting Club dates back at least to 1922.281 Each of the parties
278. Dycus, 557 So. 2d at 487-93.
279. Dycus, 557 So. 2d at 508-09 (concurring opinion).
280. Dycus, 557 So. 2d at 488, (quoting Strong v. Bostick, 420 So. 2d 1356, 1364 (Miss. 1983)); see also
Pharr v. State, 465 So. 2d 294, 298 (Miss. 1984).
281. Do not be misled by the current name and iteration shown on the website of the Secretary of State of
Mississippi, viz., "Merigold Hunting Club (Established 2004), LLC." Merigold Hunting Club, vintage 1922 is
legally alive and well and in good standing. https://corp.ms.sos.gov.
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believed they had rights the other denied. It was a conventional civil action on
the surface, while a clash of cultures smoldered beneath. No real bad guys on
either side, except perhaps in the eyes of their opponents.
As far as we know, C. R. Smith had bothered no one for years, save for
those bothered by knowing beer was being sold and consumed. No evidence
suggests the city fathers in Clinton, Mississippi, had any ulterior motives in their
early 1980s annexation, other than to enlarge the municipal limits and increase
Clinton's ad valorem tax base. Then Rev. Don Edwards and his followers-no
doubt in good faith-engaged local government processes to ban beer, thus
pitting Smith and the City against each other. Again, no bad guys, just ordinary
folk with different views of the social norms that should hold sway in their
community.
I find it hard to say much good about the Milton Pharrs among us, those of
Snopsean genre who would "headlight," render helpless, and then slaughter deer
at night, well out of season. I take the fact that four respected colleagues largely
sided with Pharr as evidence of another view. The drowning that led to
Montgomery near Savannah, Georgia, circa 1930, the other case noted above,
and the body of human conflicts beyond those few confirm a social fact. The
"human heart in conflict with itself,"282 to borrow a phrase from Faulkner, is not
only the best grounding for good writing. It is the core cause of the ambiguity of
all things human, exponentially expanding into conflict as populations grow and
people try to live together.
On June 28, 1988, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided
Commonwealth v. Neely.283 The opinion, authored by Justice Rolf Larson,
begins:
The issue presented in this case is whether the trial court erred in
refusing to instruct the jury that evidence of good character
(reputation) may in and of itself, (or by itself or alone) create a
reasonable doubt of guilt and, thus, require a verdict of not
guilty. 284
The Court answered, "Yes," and reversed the convictions for recklessly
endangering another person and for possessing an instrument of crime, ordering
a new trial. Five justices concurred, one dissented, and a seventh did not
participate.
Justice Larsen's majority opinion briefly reviews precedents in the field;285
the dissent suggests he missed a few, or at least misread them.286 Larsen
presents a bit of judicial literature dating to 1890:
282. See WILLIAM FAULKNER, Address upon Receiving the Nobel Prize for Literature in Stockholm,
Swed. (Dec. 10, 1950), in WILLIAM FAULKNER: ESSAYS, SPEECHES & PUBLIC LETTERS 119, 120 (Modern
Library Paperback ed. 2004).
283. Commonwealth v. Neely, 561 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1989).
284. Id.
285. Id. at 2.
286. Id. at 4, fn. 1.
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In Cleary287 we recognized the importance of reputation
evidence when we stated: "Of what avail is a good character,
which a man may have been a lifetime in acquiring, if it is to
benefit him nothing in his hour of peril?" Id., 136 Pa. at 84, 19
A. at 1018 (1890). As my distinguished colleague, Justice
James McDermott has commented:
"To offer evidence of an otherwise unblemished life is
not a plea of mercy. It is, in fact, to be weighed against
any present allegation to the contrary. Character
evidence may give a name to damning combinations
different than what they seem, and be the truth that sets
one free." 28 8
Larsen then turns to literature:
Indeed the value of a good reputation has been highly regarded
since antiquity. Reputation has been characterized as more
valuable than riches, precious materials and gold: "A good name
is better than great riches." Cervantes, Don Quixote pt. ii, ch. 15
(1615); "A good reputation is more valuable than money."
Publilius Syras, Sententive No. 108. "A good name is better
than precious ointment." Old Testament: Ecclesiastics, vii, I;
"Reputation is a jewel." Vanburgh, The Provoked Wife Act I,
sc., 2; "The purest treasure mortal times afford. Is spotless
reputation . . ." Shakespeare, Richard II, Act I, sc. 1, In. 177;
"It is better to have nobility of character than nobility of birth."
(Unknown).
Famous scholars, philosophers and writers have analogized
"reputation" to the dominating force that sustains life and to life
itself: "Reputation is the life of the mind, as breath is the life of
the body." Gracian, The Complete Gentlemen; "Character is the
governing element of life, and is above genius." Frederick
Saunders, Stray Leaves; "Good name in man and woman, dear
my lord, Is the immediate jewel of their souls . . . "Shakespeare,
Othello, Act iii, sc. 3, In. 155; "A good name is a second life,
and the groundwork of eternal existence." Bhascara Acharya,
Lilawati (Longfellow, Kavanaugh ch. 4); "Take away my good
name and take away my life." Thomas Fuller, Gnomologia No.
4306; "Character is destiny." Heraclitus (500 B.C.).
Other authors and luminaries teach us that reputation is virtually
immutable:
287. Commonwealth v. Cleary, 19 A. 1017 (Pa. 1890).
288. Neely, 561 A.2d at 2.
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"A great character, founded on the living rock of
principle, is, in fact, not a solitary phenomenon, to be at
once perceived, limited, and described. It is a
dispensation of providence, designed to have not merely
an immediate, but a continuous, progressive, and never-
ending agency. It survives that man who possessed it:
survives his age,-perhaps his country, his language."
Edward Everett, Speech: The Youth of Washington, July
4, 1835;
"If you hear a mountain has moved, believe; but if you hear that
a man has changed his character, believe it not." Mohammedan
Proverb.
Additionally, inspired writings show us that a good
character/reputation ensures trustworthiness: "A good character
carries with it the highest power of causing a thing to be
believed." Idem, Rhetoric; "Put more trust in nobility of
character than in oath." Solon, Dioenes Loertius, sec. 16;
"Reputation is a hallmark: it can remove doubt from pure
silver ... ." Mark Twain (from an unmailed letter dated 1886);
"Fame is a vapor, popularity an accident, riches takes wings,
those who cheer today may curse tomorrow, only one thing
endures-character." Horace Greely.289
Larsen concludes:
Often a person takes a lifetime to build his or her reputation and
when the dark clouds of life gather, one's reputation may be all
one has to ward off the impending downpour and at that moment
it may be the only beacon of truth-truth is reputation's
reward.290
A nice flourish. In Neely, Justice Larsen marshaled literature that an
adjudication be seen more reliable than it might otherwise have been. Justice
John P. Flaherty saw flat and formal29 1 the world whose four dimensional space-
time the majority opinion showed rich with humanity.
Justice Larsen knew of dark clouds from personal experience. In 1983, he
had been charged with "'injudicious politicking' on behalf of candidates for the
Supreme Court." After testimony from eighty-five witnesses and 5,000 pages of
testimony, the State Board of Judicial Inquiry dismissed the charges by a six-
three vote.29 2 Darker clouds loomed. Larsen had long suffered depression.
289. Id. at 2-3.
290. Id. at 3.
291. Id. at 4, fn. 1.
292. Marylynne Pitz and Paula Reed Ward, Rolf Larsen, former State Supreme Court Justice, Dies;
Impeached Justice was a 'Bebel in Robes', PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 13, 2014, http://www.post-
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Beginning in 1981, Larsen was said to have begun having his physician "write
prescriptions in the names of his court employees. They would they have them
filled and turn the medication over to their boss."29 3 He was charged and in
April, 1994, acquitted of fourteen counts of drug fraud, but found guilty of two
counts of criminal conspiracy.294 Rolf Larsen was impeached and removed from
office.
Shakespeare's ense of irony was a great as his humanity. He brought both
to bear in Marc Antony's oration at Caesar's funeral, that so many of us were
made to memorize at least by the tenth grade. "The evil that men do lives after
them; the good is oft interred with their bones."29 5 This is not the place for a
summing up of the life of Rolf Larsen. What is easily googled shows a complex
man who did good at times in the eyes of many, and who failed badly at other
times in the eyes of others. An exegesis of the law of reputation evidence is
beyond our scope today. Never mind that before and after Neely the dark clouds
were gathering over Rolf Larsen and that his hour of peril was approaching. The
ambiguity of all things human, most particularly man himself. The "human
heart in conflict with itself," perhaps for another besides Rolf Larsen. After all,
about five minutes on the Internet reveals John P. Flaherty as a complex and
colorful character who has had his moments,29 6 however much of a stuffed shirt
he appeared back on June 28, 1989.
VI. A SUMMING UP
Evelyn Keyes suggests that "[t]he study of the humanities by lawyers and
judges-preeminently literature, history, and moral and political philosophy-
serves four great purposes essential to the maintenance of a free society founded
upon respect for the equal dignity and worth of all." 2 97 Her premises are
agreeable enough, as points of beginning. I have tried to show how lawyers and
judges can, should, and occasionally do, practice what they have learned in these
points of study. To be sure, such practice should seldom be so overt as in the
principal cases presented above, for prudential reasons and others. Practice need
not always include the formal quotation; excessive quotations may be seen as
high brow showing off, and with counterproductive effects. Inapt quotations
compromise credibility. Lawyers and judges steeped in the humanities-may
their tribe increase-should be discriminate in practice. There are limits to the
literary dimension of the service they render.
The humanist appellate judge faces two practical realities. First, he cannot
just decide that it is time for the court to speak on this or that point of humanity.
The judge must wait for a case to arise, a case that is right. Appeals come in
many varieties, the mix being beyond the control of the appellate court, except
gazette.com/local/city/2014/08/12/Rolf-Larsen-former-state-Supreme-Court-justice-dies/stories/201408120178
(last visited Mar. 25, 2016).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, act 3, sc. 2., Ins. 80-81.
296. See, e.g., John M. Baer, A 'Leprechaun' May Succeed Nix; John Flaherty Next in Line,
PHILLY.COM, (Mar. 8, 1996). http://articles.philly.com/1996-03-08/news/25639064 (last visited Mar. 25, 2016).
297. Keyes, supra note 3 at 699.
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for those with certiorari jurisdiction. Most appellate judges still react with horror
at the thought of rendering advisory opinions, though they confuse the familiar
with the necessary. What is the precedential effect of an opinion of the highest
court of the jurisdiction in a case of first impression, or modifying or overruling
some common law rule, other than an advisory opinion that in future, factually
analogous cases the rule of decision should be thus and such?
Second, without a majority vote of one's colleagues, an appellate judge can
do nothing. I wrote Pharr, the deer headlighting case, as I did to the dual ends
of adjudging the appeal consistent with my sense of a reliable application of the
law, fairly read, to the full facts (and consistent with the majority vote) and to
satisfy some extra-judicial concerns of presiding panel Justice Roy Noble Lee.
In Dycus v. Sillers, the fishing hole case, I quoted (by then) Chief Justice Lee298
to try to hold his vote, though he ultimately wiggled off the hook.299 I thought
Justice Hawkins would be pleased with my use of the Housman quote in City of
Clinton v. Smith;300 I was surprised at his special concurring statement.30 1 No
matter, as a majority joined each opinion.
"[T]he study of the humanities by lawyers and judges ... increases the
understanding and appreciation of our common heritage, culture, and values-
and their alternatives."3 02 This is Evelyn Keyes' first purpose. I take it as a
shorthand version of Learned Hand's well-known statement quoted above.303
The practice of the humanities by lawyers and judges comfortable doing so
enhances the understanding and appreciation of others, communicating with "a
morally literate and humanistically informed people."30 4 The media assists
following Pharr (in some ways a surprise) and City of Clinton v. Smith (there
was a method in my madness there) were a bonus. Of course, no one can
quantify these "increases." That Hand and Keyes offer faith-based beliefs, as
Holmes held to his "can't helps,"30 5 does not mean these are not based as well
on experience, judicial and extra-judicial. I cannot separate effects found in my
practice from others emanating from my nine years of teaching Jurisprudence
and Legal Process at the University of Mississippi School of Law, my many
talks made at continuing education programs and civic club meetings, my
various extra-judicial writings, and my experience in living. I invite the thoughts
of others regarding the extent to which there may be a social plus from lawyers
and judges properly practicing the humanities beyond silent study.
As a second purpose, Keyes says "the study of the humanities by lawyers
298. Dycus v. Sillers, 557 So. 2d 486, 488 (Miss. 1990).
299. Id. at 508-509 (concurring opinion); see Robertson, Remembering, supra note 246.
300. City of Clinton v. Smith, 493 So. 2d 331, 335, fn. 4 (Miss. 1986).
301. Id. at 342. Lest the wrong impression be left, my regard for Justice Hawkins and his service to the
law is made clear in my many references to his work in Robertson, Variations, supra note 39.
302. Keyes, supra note 3 at 699.
303. LEARNED HAND, Sources of Tolerance, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
LEARNED HAND 66, 81 (Irving Dillard ed. 1952).
304. Keyes, supra note 3 at 699.
305. See, e.g., Letter from 0. W. Holmes to Sir Frederick Pollock (Aug. 30, 1929), in THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES, supra note 31, at 108; Letter from 0. W. Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Jan. 11, 1929), in THE
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 49, at 107; Letter from 0. W. Holmes to Lewis Einstein (June 1, 1905), in The
HOLMEs-EINSTEIN LETTERS, supra note 1, at 16.
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and judges . .. acquaints us with different modes of perception and
understanding of human predicaments and of the essential dignity and worth (or
evil [or ambiguity]) of those caught within those predicaments .".. ."306
Professor Turano adds, "It helps us to understand human problems in ways we
could not have before."307 Keyes points to "revelations of the dehumanizing
experience of slavery captured by Toni Morrison's BELOVED and of the
holocaust in Elie Wiesel's NIGHT." 3 08
Arguing again that our study of the humanities be translated into practice, I
think of powerful works like THE TRIAL by Franz Kafka, BILLY BUDD by
Herman Melville, THE Ox BOW INCIDENT by Walter Van Tilborg Clark, or
PICKING COTTON: OUR MEMOIR OF INJUSTICE AND REDEMPTION by Jennifer
Thompson-Cannino, et al. (2009). For several years in the 1980s, I made talks
about THE TRIAL and led group studies. I urged that it be required reading for
judges. As recently as the Fall of 2014, I had a chance to visit with a recently
retired judge who told me of his continuing self-reflection on THE TRIAL, having
attended one of my sessions years ago. Reading Kafka enhances one's
appreciation of the predicament of persons caught up in legal conundrums, and
not just in a criminal prosecution context.
The predicament of the unauthorized immigrant cries out for lawyers and
judges who understand and practice an acceptance of humanity. I think of the
moving testament of history in Emma Lazarus' sonnet, "The New Colossus"
("give me your tired, your poor . "), and of thrice seriously wounded Civil
War veteran Holmes' dissent in Schwimmer, the majority having denied
citizenship to a fifty year old Quaker pacifist because she would not take up arms
to defend the country.
And recurring to the opinion that bars this applicant's way, I
would suggest that the Quakers have done their share to make
the country what it is, that many citizens agree with the
applicant's belief and that I had not supposed hitherto that we
regretted our inability to expel them because they believe more
than some of us do in the teachings of the Sermon on the
Mount.3 09
Even without Lazarus, Holmes or anything beyond a fifth grader's
understanding of our history, how does any lawyer, judge, or other American not
see the core reason why ninety-eight plus per cent so consciously place
306. Keyes, supra note 3 at 699.
307. Margaret V. Turano, Moments of Grace: Lawyers Reading Literature, 72 OCT N.Y.ST.B.J. 12
(2000).
308. Keyes, supra note 3 at 699.
309. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting); II THE LAW AS
LITERATURE 592 (Ephriam London ed. 1960); THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES 324 (Posner ed. 1992). For the handful
who may not know, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., served for three years with the Massachusetts 2 0 h Regiment,
was thrice seriously wounded (Ball's Bluff, Antietam and Mayre's Crossing), and never wavered in his belief
that some wars are necessary, the Sermon on the Mount notwithstanding. Arguably the second best articulation
of the humanity of the Civil War was Holmes' Memorial Day Address delivered in Keene, N. H., on May 30,
1884. See THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES 80-87 (Posner ed. 1992).
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themselves at risk in the predicament of being an unauthorized immigrant, viz.,
that each believes us more than we believe ourselves when we say to the world
that our country recognizes the essential dignity and worth of each person, grants
and secures freedom like no other, and that it really is the land of opportunity?
Child pornography gives rise to a more troublesome category of human
predicaments, where few are without strong feelings. Justice Anthony Kennedy
once wrote in such a case that:
William Shakespeare created the most famous pair of teenage
lovers, one of whom is just 13 years of age. See Romeo and
Juliet, act I, sc. 2, 1. 9 ("She hath not seen the change of fourteen
years"). In the drama, Shakespeare portrays the relationship as
something splendid and innocent, but not juvenile."310
In 2008, a dissenting judge drew from the unsuccessful defendant's
literature expert hat a cross-section of "writers routinely publish such material,"
reflecting humanity in its complexities and capacity to baffle, citing Alice
Walker's THE COLOR PURPLE, William Faulkner's ABSOLOM! ABSOLOM! and
Vladimir Nabokov's LOLITA. 3 1 1
Justice Keyes suggests a third purpose, viz., that:
the study of the humanities by lawyers and judges ... gives us
the knowledge of evaluative and interpretive techniques and the
ability to use them so that we better understand the nuances of
words and the ambiguities in situations and in laws and are
better able to discern the real issues lurking beneath the surface
of an apparently simple (or deceptively complex) case.312
This one seems a combination of numbers two above and four below. It is
important enough that a little redundancy does not hurt.
I said my sense of the point in "An Interpretive Stratagem" in a piece I
wrote in 1994,313 augmented recently.314 Whence my thoughts of the "nuances
of words"? "A word is . . . [but] the skin of a living thought. . . ,"315 and that
lawyers and judges should learn to hold at bay the "tyranny of labels."316 My
310. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 247 (2002).
311. United States v. Whorley, 550 F.2d 326, 348-349 (4th Cir. 2008) (dissenting opinion).
312. Keyes, supra note 3 at 699.
313. James L. Robertson, The Law of Business Torts in Mississippi, 15 MISS. C.L. REV. 13, 24-57
(1994).
314. Robertson, Variations, supra note 39, at 477-97.
315. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J.); see also Thornhill v. System Fuels, Inc.,
523 So. 2d 983, 1003 (Miss. 1988) (Robertson, J., concurring).
316. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937); McKinnis v. Mosley, 693 F.2d 1054,
1057 (11th Cir. 1982); U. S. v. Oreye, 263 F.3d 669, 672 (7th Cir. 2001); Nochowitz v. Ernst & Young, 856 F.
Supp. 457, 463 (N.D. Ill. 1994) ("'Tyranny of labels' is indeed a useful concept"); J. L. Teel Co. v. Houston
United Sales, Inc., 491 So.2d 851, 857 (Miss. 1986); see also Albritton v. City of Winona, 178 So. 799, 805
(1938) ("We must not permit ourselves to be subjected to the tyranny of symbols").
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concurrence regarding "the ambiguities in situations and in laws" is grounded in
my long held faith in the ambiguity of all things human.317 More recently, "We
live life facing at least three certainties: death, taxes and the ambiguity of all
things human."318
Of course, there is the matter of being "able to discern the real issues
lurking beneath the surface of an apparently simple (or deceptively complex)
case." I always thought that comes from "learning to think like a lawyer," a
sense of which one is supposed to begin to acquire in law school. I do not mean
the rigid legal formalism once widely taught. Nor do I include the heavy dose of
exam-less practice courses that have come to dominate so many third year
curricula; those should be non-credit extracurricular experiences, like traditional
moot court programs. I do include the broad liberal arts education all law school
entrants ought to have. I say this, though I have known not a few lawyers
learned in the humanities who as eighteen-year-olds got started along other
paths.
I am not sure that whatever powers of discernment I may have may be a
function of my study of the humanities, more than the influence of my mother
who could have been a legitimate classics cholar, had she not taken the life path
of so many women born circa 1906. I suspect a lifetime or reading and thinking
and trying lawsuits and arguing points with others is within "the study of the
humanities." But this seems to be Keyes' fourth "purpose."
My attraction to the works of William Faulkner no doubt came from
growing up and living in Mississippi. My attraction to Eugene O'Neill? From
the awe of Faulkner's Nobel Prize in the late 1950s, learning that he was the
second such American after O'Neill, then becoming aware that many thought
O'Neill's best work was done after his Nobel in 1937, and immersing myself in
those last plays. I'm sure I read Albert Camus' THE STRANGER while in college,
soon thereafter THE REBEL and REFLECTIONS ON THE GUILLOTINE and others,
but in time I became fixated on THE FALL. 3 19 I suggest that the way
Montgomery, Pharr, City of Clinton and Dycus-and Neely--were adjudged,
better presented "the ambiguities in situations and in laws" in those cases, and
"the real issues lurking beneath the surface."
Keyes' fourth purpose for the "the study of the humanities by lawyers and
judges . . . [is that it] teaches us how to comprehend and express complex
thoughts (English) and how to reason logically and soundly (philosophy)."32 0 I
agree, adding that "pragmatically" is well within "soundly,"321 for those needing
a reminder.
The function of this by now too long tale has been to show how resort to the
humanities can-modestly-assist lawyers and judges in their becoming better
317. Thornhill, 523 So. 2d at 1006.
318. Robertson, Variation, supra note 39, at 478.
319. James L. Robertson, "A Fall of Fortuities (A Paean in Memory of John Hampton Stennis)," CABA
NEWSLETTER, www.caba.ms/Archives, posted (Nov. 2013), http://caba.ms/newsletters/caba-newsletter-
nov2013.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2016).
320. Keyes, supra note 3 at 699.
321. I have recently noted my debt to Judge Richard Posner's pragmatic approach to the law and legal
reasoning. Robertson, Variations, supra note 39, at 573 fn. 273.
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practicing lawyers and judges. When it comes to accepting from fortune or
aspiration one's course on this planet, there is "no substitute for the experience
of life as it is really lived," 32 2 though we add an ungrudging acceptance of
Holmes' truths that "time has upset many fighting faiths" and that the law "is an
experiment, as all life is an experiment [and that] every year if not every day we
have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect
knowledge."3 23
The humanities let us live and appreciate living, beyond the joy many find
in religion, First Amendment and more secular varieties. The humanities expose
us to the redemptive possibilities in a single lonely person with the courage to
be, functioning, and hoping against all hope. And this, despite the objective
evidence that there may not be much more to any of us than "a behaviorally
conditioned blob of billions of subatomic particles held together by the
gravitational interaction and made life-like by the electromagnetic
interaction."324 And despite Holmes' hunch when he "bet ... that we have not
the kind of cosmic importance that the parsons and philosophers teach," adding
that "I doubt if a shudder would go through the spheres if the whole ant heap
were kerosened."32 5
For my friends who are lawyers and judges, I recall Hamlet's advice to the
fearful Horatio, "there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in
your philosophy,"32 6 with a respectful reminder that law occupies but a practical
and service-oriented corner of our philosophy, properly understood. We have
little or no authority outside that practical corner and should confine ourselves
thereto. This said, lawyers and judges do have an opportunity that the proverbial
blunt instrument which we work with daily be made and seen a bit more
discerning. With hopeful hearts, we pursue optimal levels of reliability in
adjudication, our opportunities for good legal practice made richer, for in the
wake of tragedy Shakespeare with his great humanity still "speak(s) to the yet
unknowing world how these things came about,. . . , lest more mischance, on
plots and errors, happen."327
322. Id.
323. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
324. Wilbourn v. Hobson, 608 So. 2d 1187, 1196 (Miss. 1992) (Robertson, J., concurring).
325. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Lewis Einstein (Aug. 19, 1909) in THE HOLMES-
EINSTEIN LETTERS: CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND LEWIS EINSTEIN, 1903-1935, 50 (James
Bishop Peabody ed. 1964). Also reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES at xxii (Posner Ed. 1989).
326. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 1, sc. 5., Ins. 167-168.
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